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Chapter One: An Introduction to Airpower in American Foreign Policy
Airpower has a seductive nature to it.1 Technology promises to be able to destroy
or seriously damage an enemy military’s capabilities without serious risk to American
forces. Moreover, these knights of the sky have an aura of power with the ability to
destroy important pieces of military equipment or infrastructure. Airpower may seem like
a niche topic of international relations or American foreign policy, but it represents the
opening move of war. Gaining air superiority is the first step in any American
engagement as it allows the rest of American military might to be brought to bear. It is
also a selective form of engagement. It allows the United States, or any nation-state, to
attack only a limited part of an enemy state. It represents the option to engage in a limited
war or the opening salvo of a war among major powers. Because it represents an
attractive form of intervention, particularly from an American perspective, it needs
thorough examination. Any use of American military force has the potential to drastically
alter the international arena, so its use ought to be part of a carefully examined strategy
that does not merely rely on the destructive power of bombs or cruise missiles.
Airpower has gained a heightened importance with the campaign against the selfproclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as, President Trump’s recent
authorization of a cruise missile strike on Shayrat Airfield in Syria in response to the
reported chemical attack on civilians in Khan Sheikoun. The use of airpower could
further muddle an already unclear and tense geopolitical situation in Syria, or it could be
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a footnote. Regardless, it will change America’s commitments abroad and alter the
landscape of international relations.
How effective has airpower been as a tool in American foreign policy and what
strategy needs to accompany airpower to make it an effective tool? To address this
question, I divide the paper into thematic chapters that examine unique conflicts. First I
examine and debate the usefulness of drone strikes in North Waziristan against al-Qaeda.
Then, I look at the opening months of the War in Afghanistan and the strategic value of
the Afghan Model. In the third chapter, I compare how airpower was used against
Milosevic in Serbia and Qaddafi in Libya.
For this project, I primarily utilize academic articles to compare arguments about
the use of airpower. I use these academic pieces of writing to compare differing
perspectives on the debate around the usefulness of airpower as a military strategy. This
alone, though, cannot provide a basis for a conclusion, so I also point to first-hand
accounts of events that make salient points about airpower. I also turn to official military
histories or commissioned studies for history and context about each case. These official
histories also frequently provided anecdotal evidence that could also further prove or
disprove claims made in the academic literature. For broader theoretical work, several
books that are discussed in the chapters discuss the history of airpower theory and
military strategy. As this is focused on international relations, there is also a place for
theoretical works on the three primary paradigms: realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Airpower can only effectively be wielded by states, so it is important to
have a general understanding of the international system. After all, war is politics by
other means.
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Drone War in North Waziristan
Drone strikes are controversial because of the legal, moral, and humanitarian
implications of using military force via remote satellite uplink. While these are important
issues, they fall outside the purview of this thesis. Instead, I focus on the strategy of the
use of drones to fight al-Qaeda and other terror groups in this politically isolated region.
Dealing with these groups in this semi-autonomous province in the northwest of Pakistan
is a politically toxic proposition. Al-Qaeda and their associates operate within and among
civilians in these areas, so conventional military options are off the table. Special forces
raids risk upsetting the political status quo within Pakistan. They also risk tying civilian
casualties directly to American forces. Air strikes from conventional manned aircraft lack
any plausible deniability, the ability to discriminate as their loiter times are limited, and
their weapons are not suited for the mission. Artillery strikes are also out of the question
as they are meant to destroy targets over a wide area, not discriminately attack
individuals. It is a unique military problem created by a unique political situation.
Pakistan believes that these groups have strategic value to them in their regional power
struggle against India, yet the Pakistani military needs American support as well.
In this chapter I examine the roots of the drone program, which began as a
surveillance project envisioned to give the United States military total situational
awareness on the battlefield as part of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. Initially, it
appeared that the technical challenges of operating an unmanned aerial vehicle would be
impossible, but advances in satellite technology and the Global Positioning System
combined with the design of Avraheem Karem at General Atomics provided a working
model, which comes to be the recognizable RQ-1 Predator.
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The program was forever altered when a drone spotted someone who matched the
profile and behavior of Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan in 2000. The Predator, which
was unarmed, could only watch as the suspected bin-Laden slipped away. This event
served as a watershed moment because it marked the decision to arm the Predator,
primarily with the AGM-114 Hellfire, an anti-tank missile. Designed to hit vehicles, it is
well suited for use in urban settings, as it does not have a massive blast. Also, it is
reasonable to point to this moment as the start of “signature strikes”. Signature strikes
target the characteristics and behaviors of terror networks as opposed to acting solely on
intelligence.
After the Taliban and al-Qaeda were chased from Afghanistan, they took refuge
in the autonomous tribal regions of Pakistan. This represented an issue as al-Qaeda could
regroup and plan attacks against American and Western targets. Obviously, this would be
unacceptable given that it would render the invasion of Afghanistan an exercise in
futility. To reiterate, the use of conventional airpower was out of the question, as was
artillery or special forces. Drones, with advanced cameras and the ability to loiter for
dozens of hours gave the intelligence and military services an opportunity to observe a
target and pick the opportune time to strike. There are two schools of thought that vary
greatly on the strategic value and usefulness of the drone strikes.
Proponents, such as Daniel Byman, see drone strikes as the best solution to a
problem without a good solution. 2 Drones, according to this line of thought, are more
precise and discriminating than the other options. Also, they force al-Qaeda into hiding

Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice. “Foreign
Affairs (2013): n. pag. Print.
2
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and limit their communications ability to strategize about the war in Afghanistan and plan
terror attacks. When a strike eliminates a member, it also reduces their future
functionality as an organization. When a leader is eliminated, it can reduce the prestige of
the group and harm future recruiting ability.
Conversely, Bergen and Tiedemann argue that strikes undermine American
strategic interests because they stoke anger and recruitment to terror groups. 3 Also, they
argue that forcing leaders to abandon electronic communication and withdraw further
makes it harder to target these leaders for kill or capture missions. These two theories on
drone strikes are irreconcilable and represent the problem with the current discourse. It
does not formulate a comprehensive strategy to solve a problem. It relies on technology
to win on its own, which is impossible.
Drones are a novel piece of hardware and they are not well understood as tools of
foreign policy. To gain broader perspective on how drones have been used and how they
can be used more effectively, I examine which category of airpower the drone campaign
fits into, according to Robert Pape. 4 The categories themselves will be discussed indepth in the chapter, but I argue that the strikes embody part of the denial and
decapitation categories. Drones target leadership elements and attempt to decapitate
them, but these opportunities are rare and these groups do not wither and die when a
leader is eliminated. Al-Qaeda did not collapse when bin-Laden was killed. In terms of
denial, it prohibits the ability to conduct a military campaign because it restricts
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movement. I propose that the drone campaign should undertake a hybrid campaign that
targets leadership when the opportunity presents itself, but attacking mid-level fighters
and commanders are the lynchpins of the organization because they carry out the political
vision of the organization and if they are eliminated, then the group’s capacity for
violence is reduced.
Finally, I discuss the recently declassified document that outlines the Obama
Administration’s guidelines for authorizing a strike. I compare how this document fits in
with my proposed strategic vision. I also discuss under what circumstances drone strikes
would be effective.
Operation Enduring Freedom
The opening attacks of the War in Afghanistan have been hailed as a victory for
airpower. Some have argued that the Afghan Model can completely change the way
American foreign policy can be conducted because it relies on few American troops,
airpower and indigenous allies. It is easy to look at how quickly the addition of American
airpower and special forces were able to break the stalemate between the Northern
Alliance and the Taliban and claim that this model could reshape the way foreign policy
could be conducted. I argue that the Afghan Model has a certain range of adversaries it
would be useful against low to middle tier conventional adversaries. The Afghan Model
was much more successful against the Taliban when in conventional situations, but faced
difficulties against al-Qaeda forces when they adopted insurgency tactics.
The decision to use airpower combined with special forces and indigenous allies
was greatly influenced by the geostrategic circumstances that surrounded the war. This is
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important to understand if one wants to evaluate the broader applicability of the Afghan
Model. Afghanistan is a landlocked country, so the United States would need to secure
overflight and basing rights in the region. Afghanistan has Iran to the west, former Soviet
satellite states to the north, and Pakistan to the east. Each presented their own diplomatic
problems. It would also mean that building up large mechanized and infantry forces
would take a considerable amount of time and the desire to hit back after 9/11 made this
option undesirable. These diplomatic and logistical problems set the stage to solve the
problem with airpower, but given the unique circumstances that surrounded the conflict,
it shows that the Afghan Model is not readily replicable.
The Taliban and al-Qaeda perspective on potential American military
involvement is also important to comprehend because the Afghan Model is a counterstrategy to their plan to hold onto Afghanistan and make it the graveyard of empires.
They believed that the US military would respond with overwhelming numbers of troops
as the Soviets did and they could use a similar strategy as they did in that war and slowly
bleed out the Americans. They did not foresee the American urgency to strike back in
retaliation would give rise to the Afghan Model.
Then, I use anecdotal evidence and official accounts of the War in Afghanistan to
demonstrate the different situations the use of airpower encountered in the opening
months of the war. I discuss the weaknesses of the Model that were on display at the
Battle of Tora Bora because it depends on allies, who often do not share the same
political views and objectives as the US. Despite the full availability of the United States
Air Force, bin Laden was able to slip away because of differences of opinion within the
tribal groups and the dearth of American or allied troops on the ground. I also argue that
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this represented a situation more akin of an insurgency, which is one reason why
conventional military force was ill-suited for the situation. Consequently, I point to this
as one of the reasons that the Afghan Model is better suited against low-to-middle tier
conventional adversaries.
The capabilities and the usefulness of the Afghan Model in certain situations and
against a limited set of adversaries were on display in the battle of Mazar e Sharif. It
showed that allies who share the same strategic vision in a conventional conflict are much
more likely to succeed. Moreover, it could take advantage of the synergy between ground
and air forces because the political landscape was clear and the battlefield was well
understood.
Then I discuss the predominant opinions about the applicability of the Afghan
Model. Some, like Andres, Wills, and Griffith argue that it has wide applicability and can
reshape American foreign policy. They argue this because of the tactical conundrum that
airpower poses for enemy forces and how powerful the synergy between ground and air
is. On the other hand, Stephen Biddle argues that the Afghan Model has limited
applicability and does not represent a new version of American foreign policy because it
relies on allies. While I agree with Biddle on this matter, I contribute that the Afghan
Model can be extremely effective, but only in a limited range of conflict types and
intensities. Taking territory was the easier part of the war, but expecting a handful of
special forces soldiers to take territory and build a political consensus in a nation of
fragmented ethnic groups with their own political agendas was expecting too much. Once
the Taliban and al-Qaeda turned to an insurgency strategy, airpower and special forces
are much less effective. It is not a paradigm altering method of fighting war.
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Operation Allied Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn
One of the most contested uses of airpower was the 1999 campaign in Kosovo
with the directive to protect Kosovar Albanians from the Milosevic regime. There is wide
disagreement among scholars about what exactly caused Milosevic to capitulate. Some
argue that the threat of a US/NATO invasion was the coercive mechanism, while others
point to the collapse of Russian diplomatic support, and still other scholars claim that
airpower caused Milosevic to collapse. There are reasonable arguments for each, but I
argue that airpower changed the political reality for Milosevic and forced him to alter his
behavior. I do not claim that these actions were taken because of humanitarian norms, but
rather because it represented an opportunity for the US to reshape regional political order
and ensure stability in important regions.
Airpower offers a way for the US to shape regional order and international affairs
without exposing itself to the uncertainties of war. There is no consensus about how
effective airpower was at coercing Milosevic, but when one compares the situations
surrounding the campaigns in Kosovo and Libya, more truths about airpower become
evident. I solidify this argument and discuss airpower as a strategy on a broader level by
comparing Operation Allied Force to Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011 in Libya. I do
this because Milosevic and Qaddafi had similar regime types. They were both soft
authoritarian regimes that used patronage systems and the military to legitimize their rule.
In each case, airpower was a counterstrategy, so it is necessary to understand the
origins of the conflicts. I discuss the origins of the Kosovo conflict and examine the
Serbian strategy, as it is necessary to view airpower to counter ethnic cleansing. Then I
evaluate the arguments from each perspective on the effectiveness of airpower in
9

Kosovo. I do not argue that in Kosovo airpower alone forced Milosevic to capitulate, but
rather it changed his political calculus. His military forces were dispersed and hidden
because it does not require heavy forces to conduct ethnic cleansing. The campaign
switched from targeting the Serbian military to mixed use economic facilities, which
effected Milosevic’s political base and thus destabilize his hold on power. Airpower
created a situation where his hold on power was no longer tenable.
On the other side, some like Conrad Crane argue that airpower did not change
Milosevic’s mind, even though mixed-use facilities were hit. Instead, he and others argue
that the threat of US/NATO ground invasion and the collapse of Russian diplomatic
support was what hanged Milosevic’s mind about continuing his actions.
It is reasonable to compare Kosovo with Libya because they were similar regime
types that were targeted because of actions that can be categorized with targeted killing
on political adversaries. In Kosovo, it was along ethnic lines and in Libya it was
opposition political groups. Both cases though represent an effort to solidify their own
political position as Milosevic would further solidify support among Serbian nationalist
groups for reclaiming the province hailed as the cradle of Serbian civilization. Qaddafi, if
he were successful, would have remained the sole possessor of political power in Libya. I
do not claim that these actions were taken because of humanitarian norms, but rather
because it was an opportunity to reshape regional order. The US targeted Qaddafi’s
military because that was his primary way to legitimize his authority and without the
military there was a viable political alternative to his rule. This was the same mechanism
of political destabilization that was used to undercut Milosevic and given that both
regimes eventually fell, I argue that airpower had limited success.
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In neither case did airpower “win” by itself, but it created a situation where each
leader’s political reality, meaning their ability to effectively lead, control political
behavior in their counties, achieve specific policy goals, or maintain sovereignty, was
altered and produced the desired outcome that they were replaced. The ongoing
instability in Libya and the consequences of the use of airpower go beyond this paper, but
I do briefly mention it.

Chapter Two: The Drone War in Pakistan
Technology has always played a role in shaping the course of conflict; be it the
advent of the muzzle loading rifle or the steam engine. War and conflict in the 21st
century is dependent upon technology and the use of armed drones is a prime example.
Airpower has become an integral part of strategic thinking. This shift is evident in the use
of armed drones, or remotely piloted aircraft, in the Global War on Terror. In this paper,
the Global War on Terror is not a term used to denote the specific Bush or Obama
Administrations’ military actions, but rather to define the broader effort to combat
terrorism. The policy of using drones to attack al-Qaeda targets in the Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region of Pakistan has become the primary way the
United States fights this group. Drones, and airpower as a strategy, are extremely
attractive because they advertise unparcelled precision without any risk to oneself, but
placing faith in them to singlehandedly defeat al-Qaeda is misplaced. Airpower in
general, and drones specifically, cannot coerce an adversary by themselves. They must be
part of a comprehensive strategy in combination with political pressure and a force on the
ground. This force does not necessarily need to be troops. I propose an intelligence
network, but it could also be a political change. Drones can be used to weaken al-Qaeda,
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but expecting a relatively few missiles to bring an ideological group to their knees is a
folly.
In this chapter I will provide a brief history of the drone program and how it
evolved from a failing battlefield surveillance concept to the cornerstone of
counterterrorism strategy.
Then I will discuss the competing perspectives on the drone program. The
competing claims hinge on what effect civilian casualties have on al-Qaeda. Some, like
Byman5, argue that the drone program is the best of only bad options. Some in this camp,
like Fair, question the reports and polling of anti-American sentiment.6 On the flip side,
Tiedemann and Bergen argue that drone strikes only stoke anger and push recruits to
terror organizations like al-Qaeda and they are ineffective at fundamentally undermining
al-Qaeda. 7 Technology has outpaced traditional thinking in nearly every aspect of
politics, not just strategy. The key question is this, is there a way to use drone strikes that
wither terror groups’ strength while avoiding the creation of such anti-American hostility
that more people are willing to take up arms against the United States? I examine the
statistical analysis that Walsh8 and Jordan9 present and argue that drone strikes are worth
the risks in clearly defined circumstances. Clearly, each side has a coherent argument

5

Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Foreign
Affairs (2013): n. pag. Print.
6
Fair, Christine. "The Drone Papers: Intercepting the Nonsense." Lawfare (n.d.): n. pag. Brookings
Institute. Web.
7
Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone
Program in Pakistan." Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 12-18. Web.
Bergen, Peter L., and Jennifer Rowland. "Decade of the Drone." Drone Wars(n.d.): 12-41. Web.
8
Walsh, James Igoe. "The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism
Campaigns." Strategic Studies Institute (2013): n. pag. United States Army War College Press. Web.
9
Jordan, Jenna. "Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark." International Security 38.4 (2014): 7-38. Web.

12

because there are people who have been infuriated by American drone strike, but the
strikes have killed senior members like Mullah Mohammad Akhtar Manour, who was the
emir of the Taliban and “commander of the faithful”.10 He replaced Mullah Omar and
accepted al Qaeda’s oath of allegiance.
My contribution will attempt to describe a feasible strategy that attempts to avoid
collateral damage, while maintaining an aggressive posture that keeps the lynchpins of
terror groups incapable of planning major attacks. I propose the most likely strategy to
succeed is one that targets leadership only. I define leadership as a person who has forces
under their control, a key bureaucrat, or charismatic figures. These strikes should also be
more transparent, to legitimately challenge accusations of civilian death. Only using
drones to carry this out will likely fail because it does not have synergy to exploit. A
developed intelligence network will be able to better identify targets, like leaders or other
lawful targets. I will compare my proposal against the recently released “playbook” for
drone strike authorization under the Obama Administration. Drones are impressive pieces
of equipment, so what strategy aimed at defeating al-Qaeda properly utilizes their
strengths?
Theoretical Overview
The use of drones in the War on Terror, specifically in the FATA region of
Pakistan, has been one of the most controversial uses of airpower. Those opposed argue
that it lowers the threshold of conflict and ignores international law. Proponents point to
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the precision capability to deny safe havens to terror groups.11 It is controversial on a
moral level as society deals with automation and the increased capabilities of technology
in the world, but that stems from the question if their use is an effective strategy in the
fight against al-Qaeda (AQ). Remotely piloted aircraft, like the RQ-1 Predator and RQ-9
Reaper, can go places too dull, dirty or dangerous for a manned aircraft.12 Small wars and
insurgencies have replaced the great power conflicts of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Forces like Al-Qaeda do not wear uniforms or have easily discernible supply lines that
can be identified and targeted through conventional means. Instead, they are a network
that operates within and among a society, so it can often be impossible to differentiate
civilian and militant. Remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) are advertised as a platform that
offer the endurance to loiter over a target to gather information about an area and people
of interest, with the sensors to give decision makers a clear picture of what is happening
without putting Americans in harm’s way, and then weapons precise enough to kill only
the intended target. As Cockburn puts it drones represent the “unswerving faith that the
vagaries of human conflict can be overcome by technology.”13 A comprehensive strategy
for the use of drones and another element on the ground is necessary to create synergy
between ground and air forces that drones can exploit.
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Drones promise precision and a new type of bloodless war and coercive
capability, but it is yet to be seen if that is the case. For most of the program’s life, the
coercive strategy it has pursued has been unclear. As Fuller notes, the drone program,
while its scale is distinctive, is not unprecedented and marks a return to earlier thinking
on counterterror strategy.14 It is advertised and its origins come from a decapitation
background, but its extensive use and body count suggest something more like a
punishment and denial strategy. Decapitation refers to strikes that attempt to decapitate a
leader from the organization by death or the destruction of political communication
apparatus. Punishment is a strategy that attempts to break the will of a society at large,
causing widespread pain for supporting a political entity. A denial strategy is a concerted
effort to dismantle an enemy’s fighting capacity.15 These terms will be discussed and
defined later in the chapter. Determining which strategy best meets the desired ends of
the United States in this facet of the War on Terror is a vital question as the US seeks to
avoid entering another large ground operation in the Middle East and as the military
continues to look for technological solutions to strategic problems.
Drones, and airpower, are not a replacement for counterinsurgency, but rather a
tool to be used within a comprehensive strategy. A new strategy is necessary that
maximizes the incredible capabilities of drones and avoids civilian casualties and their
negative consequences. Broadly, this strategy uses selective killing of militants that are
key pieces of the organization. For comparison, the Obama administration released the
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“playbook” of when a drone strike can be launched. Does this document provide a
suitable balance between aggression and care to avoid civilian casualties? Critics of the
drone program will say, that regardless of any safeguards, any use and any casualties will
drive anti-American sentiment, which drives terror recruiting. A clear, transparent, and
cohesive strategy would avoid these criticisms. Drones should be used to strike only at
high-level leadership elements, clear militant infrastructure, or forces moving to attack
across the border.
Drones are an incredible tool, but they are just that a tool and need a strategy to
accompany them. Moreover, they need something to create synergy with. There are no
ground forces that can provide accurate targeting information. One possible solution is an
intelligence network. To exploit the technology, the drone needs to target the right
people. It must only kill members of the network that would seriously impede its
operational and strategic capabilities in the future. If precise killing is used in an
indiscriminate manner, then the population will join the fight against American interests,
policies and forces. The debate around drones and the discussion of strategy regarding
their use is important because it can change the conduct of war and conflict.
Computerized war is an attractive option as the threshold for using force is lowered, but it
could drag the United States into an unwanted conflict. As it pertains to this chapter
though, it represents the policy of conducting counterterrorism operations and poor policy
will lead to more danger to the United States and its interests.
Historical
It is no secret that the United States military has fully embraced ‘net-centric
warfare’, which values gathering and then sharing information with command and other
16

units and then quickly marshalling appropriate resources for a decisive attack as a way of
leveraging American technology as a force multiplier. Admiral William Owens, former
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress in 2001, “If we are able to view
a strategic battlefield and prevent an enemy from doing so, we have dominant battlefield
awareness and we are certain to prevail in a conflict.”16 Drones were not initially
envisioned as a weapons platform, but rather as a surveillance platform that could show
enemy movements in real time. From the onset, they were envisioned to bypass the
friction in war. Fuller also points to the mixed results of bombing Ghaddafi’s Libya in
1986 and the Beirut hostage crisis as turning points for the need of a surgeon’s scalpel as
opposed to a sledgehammer.17 Counterterrorism Center Director Clarridge realized that
the United States “had to find a better way to send a message to outlaw nations that we
don’t like their behavior short of sending in squadrons of F-111Bs.”18 The old methods of
coercion were too blunt to solve the problem. The CIA wanted a platform that could send
a clear and visible message, without massive casualties and no risk to delivery
personnel.19 This idea was dubbed the Eagle Program.
Technical Barriers
Now iconic designs, like the Predator, had extremely humble beginnings.
Avraheem Karem worked for Israeli Aircraft Industries, a state-owned design shop, until
he immigrated to the United States in 1977 to undertake his own company that
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specifically focused on pilotless aircraft.20 Initially, the only suitor for his project was the
US Navy, in need of a way to guide new, accurate cruise missiles because without
knowing where the enemy fleet is, the weapons are useless. The program failed, and
General Atomics purchased Karem’s company, Leading Systems, in 1990.21 The program
continued to muddle along and appeared headed for the scrap bin, until the GPS
revolution. Unmanned systems face two significant hurdles to overcome: navigating and
communicating over the horizon.22 The satellite revolution saved the program. With the
global positioning system (GPS) satellites, the Predator could be controlled via satellite
uplink, which made piloting the aircraft a simpler technical task, as its precise location
would always be known and geographic features could not disrupt the connection.
Drones came into their own during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999
when Pentagon staffers referred to them as “CNN in the sky”.23 The video could be
streamed into generals’ offices, giving them the ability to look directly at the battlefield
from thousands of miles away, for better and worse. One Air Force officer described the
hope that the Predator would be able to provide services that only platforms like satellites
and manned spy planes like the U-2 could provide without risking a pilot or spending
billions of dollars. Another attractive aspect of drones that neither of those platforms have
is the ability to loiter over an area for extended periods of time. A satellite can only be
above an intended area for a few minutes as it hurtles around the planet in orbit and
manned planes run on limited fuel and only has as much endurance as the human
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controlling it, so a drone offers the best of both worlds. The officer involved in the
program said, “The Air Force had this idea the Predator could be used for detecting
patterns on the battlefield. It would send back the full motion video from a wide area, and
that would be compared with previous video so they could find changes- new units
moving in or whatever.”24 The concept was complete awareness of the battlefield became
an attractive feature in the FATA region now where the lines of soldier and civilian are
blurred.
New Visions for the Program
There is nothing controversial or potentially morally dubious about the program at
this point. It is an attempt to fulfill the prophecy that technology can give America an
insurmountable advantage in warfighting capability. The decision to weaponize drones
came in October 2000 when the CIA was tasked with finding Osama bin Laden, whose
network was behind the then recent attacks on the USS Cole and the US Embassy
bombing in Nairobi, Kenya. The CIA used the Predator aircraft to observe suspected AlQaeda and Bin-Laden compound and when they were over Kandahar, they spotted a tall
man headed to a mosque surrounded with a large following. 25 Immediately, they sought
authorization to kill him. Unfortunately, a cruise missile launched from a submarine in
the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean would take hours to arrive and seeing as they could not
verify if it was in fact Bin-Laden, the potential civilian casualties would not be worth
moving assets and by the time a cruise missile could arrive too much collateral damage
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would be caused.26 This also demonstrates that selective killing, as a part of foreign
policy is not a recent political phenomenon, as this occurred under the Clinton
Administration. There was also resistance to the Predator program, according to former
CTC Director Clarke as there was the fear that it was too risky and costly,27 but seeing
Osama in their sights and being unable to do anything rapidly changed their calculus.28
This is also the dawn of “signature strikes”, as there was no positive identification that it
was in fact that it was bin-Laden, but rather behavior that fit his pattern. As will be
discussed later, a more robust intelligence network will prove more useful than any piece
of technology because knowing who you are targeting is more precise than what you are
aiming at.
In the wake of this incident, the CIA wanted to arm the Predator to avoid such a
target slipping through their fingers again. Consequently, they turned to the AGM-114
Hellfire, originally meant for Army attack helicopters as an anti-tank weapon. This
original intended purpose gave the CIA the confidence that it would be accurate enough
to hit a target like the suspected Bin-Laden compound. In the 9/11 Commission, George
Tenet said, “The leadership of the CIA reasoned that if we could develop the capability to
reliably hit a target with a Hellfire missile and could develop the enabling policy and
legal framework. We would have a capability to accurately and promptly respond to
future sighting of high value targets.”29 It passes legal muster on the grounds of the 2001
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Authorization of the Use of Military Force and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
that grants the right of self-defense.
This rush to build this new system has had massive strategic implications on the
campaign in Pakistan. It is clear in Director Tenet’s testimony that the intelligence
community did not have a clear goal or strategy for pursuing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban,
other than seeking to deal retribution.
The drone program is often described as an assassination program, with positive
and negative connotations. Positive as in the program can kill without collateral damage,
but negative as there is minimal legal framework for killing enemies of the United States
outside of a declaration of war without trial, and where no troops are present. If it is an
assassination program, then why do only one in seven strikes target leadership?30 It is
clear what the overarching thinking is that enough killing high-level members of terror
groups will cripple the group, but doing so without a clear strategy may be detrimental to
degrading, dismantling, and destroying Al-Qaeda. Moreover, which strategy should the
United States use for hunting terrorists in politically and logistically denied areas, like the
tribal regions of Pakistan and under what conditions is this use of air power effective?
Divergent Opinions on Drones
After the United States invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban in October
2001, the al-Qaeda leadership was forced to flee into Pakistan where American troops
could not pursue them as that would violate the sovereignty of Pakistan, a vital ally in the
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War in Afghanistan as it is the only land-based route for supplies to come into the
country for American troops. The Pakistani army has proven unwilling to move into the
areas and clear them. This leaves policymakers at a dead end. To a large extent, it is
because Pakistan views the Taliban and al-Qaeda as useful proxies. Leaving the AlQaeda members alone and left to their own devices in an unacceptable situation as they
can use the area to plot for more attacks on American or other European targets, thus
rendering the invasion of Afghanistan meaningless.
The obvious options are rather unattractive given the political climate. Sending
special forces across the border may offer limited civilian casualties, but any civilians
killed will be at the hands of American forces and if an operation runs into trouble, it
becomes difficult to support or extract a unit, especially with friendly casualties.
Moreover, if the Pakistani government grew irritated or reacted to public pressure to stop
it, then American forces could be in a shooting war with Pakistan, something that the
invasion of Afghanistan was never meant to cause. If an American were captured, either
by Al-Qaeda or Pakistani forces, then it would require a massive diplomatic or military
effort to rectify, which would detract from the reason forces were sent. Air strikes from
manned platforms or artillery bombardments from across the border are unattractive for
the same reasons, offensive to Pakistan and risks civilians at too high of a cost if
something goes awry.
The answer to this problem was the Predator. They can go to areas too dull,
dangerous, or dirty for a manned aircraft to go. 31 They can loiter over an area and with
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advanced thermal and optical sensors they can give commanders the ability to observe
and then decide once more information becomes available and let events on the ground
play out.
Proponent Arguments
This capability is well suited for the situation in Pakistan as Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban obviously do not wear uniforms or have standardized vehicles, so determining
civilian or militant at first glance is impossible. Proponents of the drones point to these
technological advantages and the limited political options and argue it is the only
recourse for the United States. Furthermore, scholars, like Byman, argue that their use
have been exceptionally effective at crippling the Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks
because the ability to loiter prevents leaders from moving and gathering to plan attacks in
the US or across the border. They prevent training new recruits as that requires large
gatherings of men and equipment that is easy for a drone operator to make out.
There are also questions about the accuracy of reports of a groundswell of antiAmerican sentiment. As Christine Fair points out, accurate reporting in a warzone is
difficult and that documents leaked to the press only portray a small sample.32 Leaked
statistics from “Operation Haymaker”, an operational element of the overall program,
that ran from January 2012 to February 2013. There are 35 “jackpots”, which are known
al-Qaeda or Taliban operatives, but 219 “EKIA”, or enemies killed in action. Those
critical of the drone program look at that statistic and argue that many of those killed are
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innocent. Fair, however, argues that none of those near al-Qaeda members notorious
enough to end up on the intelligence community’s docket is at the very least a terror
sympathizer and a legitimate target. It is also possible that those killed are either
bodyguards or associates and are also legitimate. She also cites a Pakistani study that
found at least 194 people killed in the attacks, about 70 percent–at least 138–were
militants. The remaining 56 were either civilians or tribal police, and 38 of them were
killed in a single attack on March 17, 2011. Excluding one catastrophically disastrous
strike which inflicted one of the worst civilian death tolls since the drone program started
in Pakistan, nearly 90 percent of the people killed were militants.33 She also makes the
case that in the FATA regions, the drones are the lesser of two evils. According to Fair,
al-Qaeda and the Taliban present a larger daily danger to civilians in these regions than
drones do. One Pakistani newspaper editorial wrote in 2012 that, heavily armed groups
using their towns as staging grounds is more of a threat to their sovereignty and safety
than drone strikes. It also argues that militancy that arises out of drone strikes is a minor
problem compared to other sources.34
It is possible that local villagers resent the terror groups using their villages as
safe havens, which makes them targets. They may also resent them for usurping their way
of life and political structures, like the sentiments that spurred the Sunni Awakening in
Iraq in late 2006 and early 2007. This view and posture is overall too aggressive
represents a vengeful side of American foreign policy thinking. This is killing without a
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cause. There is no end goal for strikes under this theory other than killing terrorists is
good. There must be a more reasonable and level-headed approach.
Dissent on Drone Strikes
Others, like Tiedemann and Bergen view drone strikes as overall detrimental to
American efforts because the civilian casualties the accompany the strikes only stoke
anti-American sentiment and any militants killed are replaced. As former head of Joint
Special Operations Command and current choice for the Trump Administration’s national
security advisor, General Michael T Flynn said, ““When you drop a bomb from a
drone… you are going to cause more damage than you are going to cause good… the
more bombs we drop, that just… fuels the conflict.”35 The detractors of the drone
program argue that any “decapitation” of a leader will only spur more recruits, thus
increasing the organization’s size and popularity relative to before the strike.
There are two divergent opinions on the policy of drone strikes, so is one side
correct? The truth lays somewhere in between. A sound strategy is one that is not as
cavalier as Fair demands, but the opportunity chip away at al-Qaeda and other groups
cannot be denied. Drones strikes are the only politically acceptable option in these
circumstances, but they need to have a clear strategic vision and guidelines. Air power
does not guarantee victory by any means. It is a tool, that if used incorrectly, can prove
more harmful than doing nothing at all.
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Strategic Picture
The two prevailing perspectives offer a polarized view on drone strikes, but it
takes a detailed and clear strategy to succeed. Strategy is what connects means and ends,
so in the efforts to defeat al-Qaeda there must be a concerted effort use drones in a way
that completes the objective of destroying al-Qaeda, while not creating problems for the
future. The debate about drone strikes needs more nuance. A strategy that can emphasize
the incredible abilities while avoiding the civilian casualties is what is required. Both
sides passionately argue for their views to be heeded, but only the pro-strike camp has a
testable way to defeat al-Qaeda. Albeit, this does not mean the order to fire at will should
be given, as Fair would have it. Rather, there must be a balance.
Each side makes a strong case, but there needs to be a strategy to reconcile the
differences while accentuating strengths and minimizing weaknesses. The overarching
question remains that while drones are an effective tactic, are these military victories
translating to political success?36 Because of drones’ inherent qualities, they are well
suited for attacking al-Qaeda leadership. The goal behind striking leadership is to take
charismatic personalities that these organizations need for recruitment and legitimacy off
the roster and these personalities are not easily replaced.37 Although Bin-Laden was not
killed in a drone strike, al-Qaeda has struggled to replace him with Ayman al-Zawahiri
and have thus fallen in the terrorist hierarchy. This causes the promotion of inexperienced
and unqualified leaders who stumble into errors that will then gradually deplete the
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manpower of the organization. Eliminating high value targets is the goal, but as Byman
notes, killing specialists, like forgers, bombmakers, and fundraisers, which eliminates
skills that cannot be replaced overnight. Proponents, like Byman, also argue that because
drones can loiter for hours and aircraft rotating in can make surveillance constant, it is
impossible for leadership to meet or communicate. Drone strikes can make training and
command and control apparatus a threat to their safety because the group must choose
between having no leaders or dead leaders.38 As America seeks to draw down its
presence, drones allow for a smaller footprint and as previously mentioned, they are less
destructive than conventional alternatives.
On the other hand, other scholars and analysts like Tiedemann and Bergen, argue
that drone strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan undermine the broader effort to defeat
al-Qaeda because the civilian casualties that come with the strikes stokes anti-American
sentiment, thus replacing the losses in the initial strike. Furthermore, what have the
strikes accomplished? They have made terror leaders cease using electronic
communication, making tracking them more difficult. Attempted attacks have still
occurred, like the Detroit Christmas Day airplane bombing and the failed Time’s Square
bomber in 2010 received training in Pakistan. Walsh also points out that attempting to
decapitate leadership is only effective if the organization is small and thus unable to
sufficiently replace men.39 Walsh also raises a unique criticism that because the United
States does not know which groups are on the ground and that targeting the area without
understanding the group dynamics may change and create new alliances among terror
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groups, which may be more dangerous than before because of drones. That is why I
propose the drone program needs to be meshed with an intelligence network to create
synergy and it will be a more effective strategy.
The divergence in opinion does not provide a clear understanding for how to
proceed with combating terrorism. The United States cannot cede territory and a haven to
al-Qaeda and drones are the only viable option. One needs to turn to numerical analysis
to formulate a strategy that can operate between the polarized opinions. Ultimately, alQaeda cannot be allowed to operate with impunity, so drone strikes present a useful tool,
but they should not be relied on as a strategy by themselves.
Need for a Cohesive Strategy
Drones can be an effective coercive tool, but only in limited conditions and within
a clearly defined strategy. Although the drone program has been labeled as an
assassination program, the numbers of senior leaders killed in drone strikes do not
support this. This fact demonstrates the overall lack of a cohesive strategy. At the heart of
the debate on drones as a strategic coercive tool, is the question about how many civilians
have they killed. Obviously, this is a difficult task given that there is no way to
independently verify reports. Pakistani media outlets likely have inflated reports because
they are getting information from insurgents or pushing an anti-American sentiment to
grab attention.
The United States had run the program through the Central Intelligence Agency,
so it would often decline comment about a strike and if it did announce that a militant
was killed, the numbers of civilians killed would be significantly lower than the Pakistani
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report. So, one must turn to outside data. According to the New America Foundation,40 a
non-profit, open source database that has tracked every reported drone strike. By their
tally, during the height of the program in 2011, the United States had struck Pakistan 233
times. From June 2004 to April 7, 2011 drone strikes killed between 1,435 and 2,283
people and somewhere between 1,145 and 1,822 of those were described as militants in
reliable press sources.41 Tiedemann and Bergen argue that even though more than 1,000
militants have been taken off the battlefield, attacks have sharply risen from the time
before drones were used. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center,
attacks in Pakistan have risen from 150 in 2004 to 1,916 in 2009. Also, suicide attacks
tripled in the first half of 2010 compared to the first half of 2009.42 This would seemingly
confirm that drone strikes do in fact cause more harm than good because they stoke anger
and force groups to morph into more cells that have more autonomy. But Walsh’s use of
30-day regression analysis through 2011 reveals a different pattern and he argues that the
there is no proof that drone strikes are galvanizing the insurgency.43
In Afghanistan and Pakistan through 2011, attacks were on the rise, which would
give credence to the argument that Tiedemann and Bergen espouse, but after this date,
there is a decline in terrorist activity. Furthermore, there appears to be no correlation
between the number of civilians killed and terror attacks. When attacks were at their peak
in 2010-2011, civilian casualties were either in decline or level. As 2011 progressed,
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attacks decreased as did civilian casualties. For there to be a causal relationship, civilian
casualties would need to rise as well as attacks for the argument to stand up. The data for
Afghanistan shows that terror attacks increase before drone strikes and then decrease
after. That may sound convincing that drones are a net positive, but it is plausible that the
terror groups expend their energy and resources and then need to retreat. Drones may not
be a part of their calculus of when to launch attacks in Afghanistan at all. In Pakistan in
2010, terror attacks were met with increased drone strikes. As the year progressed, and
the number of militants killed increased, attacks decreased, which suggests that drone
strikes reduced terror groups ability to launch strikes.44 As with any data set, it is up to
interpretation, so one can only extrapolate. Also, the evidence is limited insofar as it only
suggests the effects and consequences of drone strikes, but these events are not occurring
within a vacuum and could be attributed to other causes, like the increase in American
forces in Afghanistan in 2010 or the killing of Osama bin Laden, which forced al-Qaeda
to restructure. From a strategic standpoint, these strikes do not change the overall balance
because they have not been integrated into a general counterterror strategy.
Drone strikes are effective at tracking, targeting, and killing militants, but it is
unclear what exactly the strikes are attempting to accomplish. The fact that only one in
seven strikes killed a high-level leader does not indicate a decapitation strategy. The
civilian casualties indicate a desire to wither support for the terror groups. Drones are
clearly not a detrimental tool because of their incredible capabilities, but they need a
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strategy to maximize their positive capabilities while minimizing the civilian casualties
and their negative effects.
Categorization of Drones
The four categories of air power strategy that Pape describes are punishment, risk,
denial, and decapitations. The campaign in Pakistan does not fit neatly into a single
category, but they all share the goal of inducing some political change. The primary
criticism of drone strikes is that they cause civilian casualties, so Pape’s first category of
punishment is not applicable. A punishment campaign would be conducted to cause the
maximum damage and shock an enemy population.45 A punishment strategy is
comparable to the carpet-bombing campaigns in the Second World War, indiscriminately
targeting cities. A punishment strategy carried out to a lesser extent would target civilian
infrastructure. The objective of such a strategy is to cause a popular revolt. Pursuing such
a strategy runs afoul of moral norms, but it would be completely ineffective seeing as the
tribal regions of Pakistan do not have major pieces of infrastructure. Punishment is
intended to cause as much misery as possible to make the targets capitulate instantly. A
popular revolt is also unlikely as al-Qaeda are already a fringe group and in northern
Pakistan they are among their tribal counterparts, so expecting a betrayal is rather
unlikely.
A risk campaign is like punishment, but instead of immediate, massive
destruction, it would gradually raise the pace and intensity of strikes to force a society to
reconsider the costs of continuing a conflict. This was the strategy employed in Vietnam.
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The third category, denial, attacks military targets, including field forces, logistics,
command centers, communication nodes, and weapons plants and raw military material.
A decapitation strategy attacks key leadership targets, like homes and respective offices.
The objective of a decapitation strategy is to separate the leadership and elites of society
from the general population and offer a society an alternative to violence. The separation
can be the grave or severing any ties they have to society that could be used to apply
pressure to the society. It also targets communications networks and political centers and
economic hubs to cut off leadership to cause political paralysis.46
Organizations, like al-Qaeda, may be more hardened against decapitation because
they have a developed bureaucracy.47 Al-Qaeda has existed long enough to develop
institutional routines that establish norms and rules for recruitment and a chain of
command, eliminating succession problems. A leader’s message becomes part of the
institution over time and even if a leader is eliminated, the message can be a proxy for the
personality.48 The argument against decapitation theorizes that targeting leadership is
“unlikely to diminish al-Qaeda’s long-term operational capacity to engage in terrorist
activity.”49 Al-Qaeda’s behavior as a group does not indicate a weakness to decapitation,
according to Jordan. She argues that because al-Qaeda is a religious group with enough
size, it has the experience to resist decapitation because older and larger groups have
developed a bureaucracy to replace losses.
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This perspective holds true if taking about one individual leader. Had a drone
strike been used to kill Osama bin Laden in May 2011, Ayman al-Zawahiri would still
have ascended to head the organization. That is not the point of the drone program as
evidenced throughout its history and extensive use. The point of the drone program is to
wage a war of attrition without placing any American personnel in harm’s way. No
organization can withstand the repeated loss of mid-level commanders, financiers, and
other experts. It is like a football team losing players to injury throughout the season. A
good team can withstand an injury to one key individual, but the sustained loss of role
players throws the team into chaos and they lose cohesion. Price, among others, take a
similar view and agree with the sentiment that terror groups are vulnerable because of the
importance of leadership and the difficulties of succession.50 Terror groups do not want to
advertise their organizational hierarchy and chain of command because that would make
them susceptible to attack. There are also competitions for power within groups, so the
elimination of leaders, especially mid-level ones, can radically alter the group.
Outlining a More Effective Policy
The drone strikes embody parts of denial and decapitation strategies, but neither is
perfectly suited for the drone campaign. As a denial strategy, drones are used to attack
forces in the field and command centers, but al-Qaeda is an insurgency and does not have
clear command structures. It operates within and among a society. Also, its
communication network is either a public satellite network or the regular cellular data
network. Completely dismantling this is not in the interest of pursuing a strategy to
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dismantle al-Qaeda because the signals intelligence gathered often provide the locations
for strikes. Recently, ISIS spokesman Mohammad al-Adnani was killed in a strike in
Syria because he was most likely picked up by signals intelligence, which shows how
effectively drones can be in a hunter-killer role.51
The US military attacked cell towers or commercial satellites, this would not have
been possible. Now ISIS faces the conundrum of how to deliver their message. Of course,
any opportunity to strike training facilities or fighters moving into Afghanistan ought to
be taken, but al-Qaeda does not wear uniforms and insurgencies are diffuse, so these
opportunities are rare. The decapitation strategy is the goal. Ideally, one would like to
target centers of political power and cordon al-Qaeda off from the rest of the world, but
again al-Qaeda is an insurgency and insurgencies do not have political offices or
economic infrastructure. Again, they share resources with the society they operate
among. The core concept is that al-Qaeda and other terror groups offer no simple
prescription because they are amorphous and not easily categorizable, but a sound drone
strategy will decapitate leaders from rank and file members by death or fear of it. This
new strategy should also grasp onto certain aspects of a denial strategy as it prevents
fighters from training, mobilizing, or launching attacks. That is why I hypothesize that
developing an intelligence network will yield the best results at finding these key role
players and thus finding opportunities to target them without civilian casualties.
What is required is a hybrid campaign. A balance between aggression and
patience. Drone strikes should be used to attack leadership elements. I define leadership
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elements as not only those that are on well-known to the public and media, like Zawahiri
or al-Baghdadi, but the mid-level commanders that carry out the operations of groups.
These are the targets most vulnerable to attack and are the most difficult to replace.
Senior leadership can avoid the use of electronic communication because they focus on
strategic issues of the groups, but commanders need to receive and share information,
which requires some use of electronic message. Courier is simply too slow. Aggression
towards the middle ranks is most likely to alter their behavior and slow terror activities.
Some may point to the mixed findings in studies like Igoe’s that do not find a
consistent link between drone strikes in Pakistan and increased attacks in Afghanistan.
Clearly, drone strikes are not provoking the reaction that some have anticipated, but the
objective of the drone program is not to slow insurgent activities in Afghanistan, it is to
undercut al-Qaeda. The drone campaign has been fundamental in the disruption of alQaeda, as evidenced by their failure to organize a well-funded and well-coordinated
attack on American or European soil. It may also force the charismatic leaders to put
themselves into public view, which then puts them at risk.
Drones are only a piece of counterterrorism and they should be used to disrupt
organizations, like al-Qaeda in the FATA region, but they should not be counted on to
singlehandedly destroy them. There needs to be a synergy between drone strikes and
some other force, be it the Pakistani military or an increased NATO presence in eastern
Afghanistan and a concerted propaganda campaign. Drone strikes do not fundamentally
alter the politics of these regions because the amount of violence they bring is relatively
small, which is why they can, at best, be a disruptive force. That disruption should then
be used to push back on other areas, like counterinsurgency and propaganda.
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Also, airpower needs another element to synergize with. There are no forces on
the ground to direct strikes or collect information. The program relies on intelligence
from sources in cities elsewhere in the world. What could create synergy are proper spy
networks in the area. Obviously, this would be difficult given the suspicion of outsiders
and the family connections that define the regions, but it is worth trying. These networks
could help avoid civilian casualties, thus reducing the recruitment backlash. It would also
increase the opportunity to target specific leaders or groups of fighters. Airpower needs to
be combined with another force on the ground to be able to take advantage of the
technology and capabilities that drones provide.
Signature strikes should no longer be tolerated given the intense scrutiny of
civilian casualties, regardless of their perceived “innocence”, as Fair would have it. The
way the United States can have the drone program backfire is if it loses the propaganda
war. Signature strikes, when remotely piloted aircraft target suspicious behavior, like
convoys of vehicles or larger gatherings, have led to mistakes and civilians killed.52
Strikes should only be used when there is a relative certainty that civilians are not
endangered by a strike. In small villages, like in the FATA region, this is difficult, but it
means waiting for the right opportunity. If civilians are in the way, then a strike should
only be undertaken once they leave the area. If they do not, then perhaps a strike should
not be authorized. Of course, this depends on the importance of the target, if it were
Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, then obviously, the United States should
strike. If it is a financier or low-level commander is the target, then that opportunity
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should be passed on because they will most likely present themselves again. The United
States also ought to be transparent about strikes that are contested. If a group is claiming
that civilians were killed, then the Department of Defense, which now runs he drone
program,53 should release a commentated video detailing why authorization was given.
This policy would represent a more effective use of airpower in a time when war is not
between states because the boundaries of 21st century conflict are blurred at best.
Winning the propaganda war is more important than a body count.
The Playbook
The Obama Administration released its so-called “playbook” for authorization of
a drone strike. The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) that outlines “The Procedures for
Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States
and Areas of Active Hostilities.”54 This is an improvement over the times of CIA control,
which would deny when a strike would occur, but there are still areas of ambiguity that
need to be clarified before this program can be a part of a viable counterterror strategy.
The document states that “The most important policy objective, particularly informing
consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.”55 This does not clearly define
how expansive a threat is. It does not seek a balance between aggression and patience
because how expansive the category is. This is partially to give the Obama
Administration leeway to make decisions, but it shows that the technology has outpaced
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the understanding of how it should be applied. It also states the preference for capture,
which is a good idea, given that captured targets can give intelligence, as opposed to the
dead, who cannot. Although, raids are riskier and are thus less likely to be approved than
a drone strike. It defines a non-combatant as someone who is not targetable under the law
of armed conflict, thus eliminating some of the objections to reporting and assessment of
collateral damage that Fair raises.
The document outlines that a strike is authorized when there is near certainty that
an identified HVT or other lawful targets are present, near certainty that non-combatants
will not be injured or killed, and capture is not feasible because of the risk to American
personnel and/or the incapacity of a regional actor to deal with the problem. This would
be a person placing improvised explosive devices or munitions stores. Before a strike is
launched, the HVT needs to be positively identified and the relevant officials, including
the President agree that a strike is necessary. It also outlines how the authorization from a
strike moves from the intelligence community up to the President, which gives more
transparency to the process. The requirement for positive identification also prevents a
strike based on faulty intelligence. It also creates a uniform after action report that
requires: a description of the operation, a summary to determine that the operation
satisfied the criteria for a strike, an assessment of whether the operation achieved its
objective, the number of combatants killed or wounded, and a description of collateral
damage.56
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Make no mistake about it, this represents strategic progress, but it is still too
vague and seems to address the fear of casualties more than it seeks to achieve the
objective of degrading al-Qaeda. Fundamentally, war is about killing and
counterinsurgencies are about killing the right people. Drone strikes should look to attack
the lynchpins of al-Qaeda. Obviously, civilian casualties ought to be avoided, but as Igoe
points out, drone strikes have little influence, positive or negative, on the amount of
insurgent violence.57 Skeptics like Jordan are correct in their theorization that some
insurgent groups are large and have enough bureaucratic resilience to overcome losses,
but they cannot overcome the consistent depletion of mid-level commanders.58 The PPG
is a positive step towards transparency, but using the video to shame al-Qaeda for using
human shields and should highlight the efforts that the US goes to avoid civilian
casualties. The proper drone strategy is one that looks for small victories, which will keep
the core of the organization on the run and incapable of planning and organizing for
attacks against the United States or the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, if there is a
risk of civilian casualties, authorization should not be given because drones alone will not
destroy al-Qaeda. Ideally, there would be pressure on al-Qaeda on multiple fronts. That
would include pressure from the drone strikes, propaganda, special forces raids, and then
the Pakistani military would encircle and clear the areas. Asking drones to destroy alQaeda by themselves is a fallacy. An intelligence network would create synergy for
drones and perhaps create an alternative to the kinetic option.
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Conclusions About Drone Strikes
There are two prevailing perspectives on drone strikes in the FATA region in
Pakistan. The first postulate is that drone strikes espouses that drone strikes spur
recruiting and backlash against the United States, like Tiedemann, Bergen, and Benjamin
argue. Others, like Jordan, argue that drone strikes are not effective against bureaucratic
organizations, like al-Qaeda. Drone advocates, like Byman and Fair, although she is more
towards the extreme, argue that drones are the best of bad options and cite evidence, like
Igoe’s analysis, that there is no correlation between drone strikes and terrorist activity.
They also question the validity of reporting on the anger that drone strikes cause. The
truth is that drones are neither dubious, morally bankrupt assassins, nor are they a
panacea to destroy al-Qaeda singlehandedly. They need to be integrated into a broad
counterterror strategy that presses al-Qaeda. They ought to be utilized in a decapitation
role that selectively engages critical organizational infrastructure, like financiers and
operational commanders. But if civilians are in the way, the strike is not worth the cost
and patience is the best strategic option. Ultimately, the drone campaign ought to find the
balance of aggression and patience that embodies all counterinsurgency efforts. It also
needs to find synergy to exploit.
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Chapter Three: Invasion of Afghanistan and an Examination of the
Afghan Model
The opening blows of the War in Afghanistan are often cited and hailed as an
outright victory for airpower as a military and foreign policy strategy, but the results are
much less conclusive than that. I hypothesize that airpower was most effective against the
conventionally organized Taliban when fighting against the relatively equally skilled
Northern Alliance. Airpower was much less effective against the higher skilled al-Qaeda
forces. Therefore, I conclude that the “Afghan Model” should only be replicated against
low-to-middle tier conventional adversaries.
In this chapter, I analyze the unique geostrategic circumstances that created the
need for this strategy. Furthermore, I discuss the differing perspectives on the
applicability of the “Afghan Model”, which ranges from a unique circumstance, to a
paradigm shifting strategy that would alter the conduct of war. I draw conclusions about
the “Afghan Model” by charting the progress of the opening stages of the conflict and
comparing the success of the strategy against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. To do this, I used
first-hand accounts and official histories. Often anecdotal evidence and accounts from the
war boost the credibility of the “Afghan Model” and airpower as a whole, but instead I
saw a limited range of conflict type and intensity where the Model was useful. The goal
of this chapter is to show that airpower cannot be used as one-size-fits-all tool of coercive
political power. Rather, when used in the right situation, against the right adversary, it
can have an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. Synergy between ground and
air, is more important than attempting to achieve victory merely by superior firepower.
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Historical Background
9/11 called for swift, decisive action. It is no coincidence that the first CIA teams
inserted into Afghanistan in early October 2001 were given the call sign, Jawbreaker.59
The desire for revenge and justice against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was almost
instantaneously damped when the realities of going to war in Afghanistan set in. As then
Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice notes, “You look at the map, you look at
Afghanistan and you look at where it is- I think the color kind of drained from
everybody’s face… I think everybody thought ‘Of all the places to fight a war,
Afghanistan would not be our choice.’ But we didn’t chose Afghanistan; Afghanistan
chose us”.60
This geographic reality limited the options that military planners had, so the only
realistic option was turning to airpower combined with special forces fighting alongside
allied indigenous forces. Dubbed the “Afghan Model”, this use of military strength,
combining special forces, airpower, and indigenous allies, has been heralded as a more
efficient way of warfighting.61 “The United States took decisive action. With Special
Operations Forces, CIA operatives, and US airpower in support, the Northern Alliance
and friendly Pashtun tribes in the south were able to vanquish the Taliban forces and

59

Schroen, Gary C. First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in
Afghanistan. New York: Presidio/Ballantine, 2007. Print.
60
Wright, Donald. "A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001–September 2005." Combat Studies Institute (2010): n. pag. Web. 37
61
Andres, Richard, Craig Willis, and Thomas Griffith. "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the
Afghan Model." Project MUSE - Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model.
International Security, n.d. Web; Biddle, Stephen D. "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan
Model in Afghanistan and Iraq." International Security 30.3 (2006): 161-76. Web; O'Hanlon, Michael. "A
Flawed Masterpiece." Foreign Affairs 81.3 (n.d.): n. pag. Web.; Biddle, Stephen. Military Power:
Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. Print.

42

chase them and their al-Qaeda allies into Iran and Pakistan.62” The manner and speed
with which the Taliban were dispatched and the technological leaps that the 21st century
offered gave the illusion that the long-proclaimed “Revolution in Military Affairs” had
been realized and that the nature and conduct of war would be decided by technology and
expertise. While the prediction that airpower would reign supreme and the “Afghan
Model” of warfighting would alter American military posture were premature and faulty
in their conclusion, it did highlight the potent synergy between ground and air forces.
Many point to the fact that in under two months, the Northern Alliance, who had been
stuck in a stalemate against the Taliban, could vanquish the Taliban once special forces
combined with strike fighters and bombers armed with precision-guided munitions joined
them. The stunning statistics that in fewer than eight weeks, six provinces, three key
cities were liberated and about 10,000 Taliban forces were killed.63 It also demonstrates
the importance of a clearly defined political objective. Moreover, the lessons from the
rapid assault of Afghanistan should be understood within the context of the engagement
and not be applied to a conflict of different intensity or a more capable adversary.
The Afghan Model was more successful against the Taliban when they organized
as a conventional force, but was less successful against al-Qaeda fighters who utilized
tactics that are typical of an insurgency. Moreover, the Afghan Model is only useful in a
specific range of conflict intensity against conventional forces that belong to a nationstate. Understanding these lessons and the context is significant to using the assets of the
United States military in a way that will produce positive outcomes. This is especially
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important in this time as the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State rages on and a
similar strategy is being employed.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were unsure exactly
how the US would react.64 The way previous administrations responded to terror attacks
at the Marine Barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the USS Cole attack in 2000, and the US
Embassy bombing in Nairobi in 1998 offered only a fraction of the ferocity that the
American military could bring to bear. The attacks of 9/11 were directed at American
landmarks and symbols of American power.65 Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were somewhat
emboldened by the weak responses of the previous decade. No doubt they understood
that there would be bombs and cruise missiles, but they were confident that they could
weather that storm, as they already had. They also believed that if the US conducted a
full-scale invasion, they could bleed them out in the same manner as the Soviet Union.
As it often is in war, the least expected scenario is the one that came to fruition. Given the
political and geographic restrictions that Afghanistan, the way the war commenced, a mix
of airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies it was the only way it could have
unfolded.
Logistics and Politics
General Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, quipped in
1980 that “Amateurs think about tactics, but professionals think about logistics”.66 The
emergence of the Afghan Model also had much to do with Afghanistan’s geostrategic
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position. As the quote from former Secretary Rice indicates, fighting a war in
Afghanistan would be a logistical nightmare. As a landlocked country, a naval
expeditionary force was out of the question. Located in central Asia, there are neither
nations in the vicinity part of NATO nor were they politically capable of lending the US
full support. It would be impossible to only conduct the air campaign via long range
strategic bombers. Air crews have limited stamina and the maintenance required on these
vital national assets can put them out of commission for days at a time. There also must
be search and rescue crews on standby in the area of operations to recover crewmembers
of downed planes and the sensitive equipment they carry. Conducting missions without
nearby search and rescue and assorted support staff would put the entire campaign at risk.
To conduct a campaign like this, basing rights are essential. As Wright points out,
negotiating these agreements is extraordinarily difficult. In the north, Afghanistan is
neighbored by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. As
former Soviet satellite states, they remained in Moscow’s sphere of influence and putting
heavy mechanized forces there would prove politically infeasible67.
To the south-east is Pakistan, which came with its own unique political obstacles.
Pakistan had always been interested in the politics of its neighbor. Fearful of being
encircled by hostile states, it had sheltered and supported the mujahedeen in the 1980s. In
2001, not only was the population sympathetic to the Taliban, the Pakistani government
was threatening conflict with India at the time.68 After 9/11, Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage, gave senior Pakistani officials an ultimatum of support America or

67
68

Wight, 35
Wright, 36

45

fight it.69 Pakistan came around eventually to provide logistical support, but many
including James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s Special Envoy for the post-Taliban
conferences questioned how committed Pakistan really was, “After 9/11 the American
and Pakistani services found themselves suddenly aligned again, this time in seeking to
overthrow the very regime the ISI had installed in Kabul.”70 There were legitimate
questions as to how seriously Pakistan would attack a potentially useful surrogate. To the
west, Iran. Given Iran’s perpetual opposition to American interests, it would be of no
help. To secure the necessary basing and overflight rights, careful diplomacy was
necessary. Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the leaders to offer moral support
and the use of Russian air space. He also urged the central Asian states to cooperate. That
support was limited as Russia would obviously not tolerate heavy mechanized forces on
its southern border for an extended period.71 Even with the cooperation of these states
and limited Russian cooperation, the bases were not suitable for heavy transport aircraft
and such a buildup would take too long and thus allow senior leadership to flee.
The Afghan Model
The only realistic plan to respond was with small special forces teams (SOF) and
with air power working alongside the Northern Alliance. For any other state, these
obstacles may have proved insurmountable, but the United States military was in a
unique position to launch sustained air campaign. Global basing of strategic air assets,
particularly at Diego Garcia AFB, an atoll with a military grade airstrip put American
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forces in the region. The US military also has an unrivaled aerial tanker fleet that could
make strike missions from farther outposts possible. The ten aircraft carriers that are the
bedrock of the US Navy also provide ample opportunity to hit back, but it still requires
flyover rights from Pakistan. Waging a war with airpower in the forefront is
diplomatically straining and requires a vast logistical network that very few states can
attempt. It is not a solution to every military contingency.
The question of the applicability of the Afghan Model looms large, especially
given the rise of IS and disorder within Syria. The speed and decisiveness of the rout of
the Taliban surprised all involved, including the war planners, who viewed the
combination of special forces and indigenous allies mostly as stage setters for a larger
force.72 Some, like Andres Wills and Griffith, see broad applicability and others, like
Biddle see its use in a much more restricted set of scenarios. As Biddle points out, then
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified and argued that the rapid assault was so
effective, the US military should shift its doctrine and fully commit to it by decreasing
the number of infantry forces and increasing the investment in standoff weapons.73 This
is the allure of airpower; its power and destructive capability show a way to fight a war
without friction or chaos, just ballistic calculations.74 If one adheres to the postulation
that the combination of airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies is an unstoppable
force, then the need for ground forces and en masse infantry engagements is gone.
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Commitment to the Afghan Model without skepticism, let alone fundamental
changes to military posture, would be a failure of policy and strategy. I concur with
Biddle that the applicability of the Afghan Model is narrow, but I argue that using
airpower in such a manner can, at most, provide a tactical battlefield victory and, at
worst, undermine the overarching strategic objectives and reasons for using airpower and
American power in the first place. Moreover, the Afghan Model ought to only be used
against middle tier convention adversaries fielded by nation-states. This avoids complex
tribal politics and allows synergy between ground and air to be exploited.
Taliban Origins and Strategy
To fully comprehend and evaluate the Afghan Model, one must be somewhat
familiar with the strategy and political views of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is also
important to recognize these realities because if American forces work and operate
among these people, it would be wise to be aware of more than just the American
perspective. There is a common misconception that Afghanistan is a place that is stuck in
the Middle Ages, but it has a long and complex history that go beyond the scope of this
chapter. 75 After the Soviet Union withdrew, a period of civil war ensued against the
Soviet-backed Communist regime that remained in Kabul until it collapsed in 1991.76
The origins of the Taliban’s political ideology come from the generation of
generation of young men displaced by the Soviet invasion who were exposed to
fundamentalist Islam that thrived in Pashtun areas in the areas around Peshawar.
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Fundamentalism combined with the anger from unemployment that comes with refugee
status developed a culture that sought, simple answers to Afghan problems and these
answers often came through violent means.77 The Taliban, as a political entity, are
primarily based on tribal allegiance, despite claims of a universal ideology and often
brutalized other ethnic groups. 78 Their battle against these other ethnic groups that come
to be known as the Northern Alliance was mostly fought as a conventional battle for
territory to solidify their political rule in the opening moves of the war.
For al-Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden, Afghanistan was the first state in a new
caliphate.79 The Taliban and al-Qaeda formed a symbiotic relationship because of Osama
bin-Laden’s ability, experience and funding to set up training camps that prepared
fighters to do battle against the Northern Alliance. Beyond the idea that Afghanistan was
the beginning of a caliphate, it gave bin-Laden the legitimacy to declare jihad against the
US for the perceived occupation and plunder of Arabia.80 To reiterate, the Taliban and alQaeda believed that based on the response to the attacks against the USS Cole and the
Nairobi embassy, the US would launch airstrikes and send cruise missiles, but they knew
that they could avoid the likely targets and survive. If the US decided to launch a fullscale invasion, then they could use that as propaganda to foster recruitment and build the
narrative of a battle of the West versus Islam. The Taliban and al-Qaeda expected a large
American invasion to fare as well as the Soviet invasion and occupation went.
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They would have likely repeated the same tactics and strategies that would bleed
out a large, cumbersome conventional force that was not capable of engaging guerrillas.
The Bush Administration was cognizant of Afghanistan’s reputation as the “graveyard of
empires”81 and thus desired to avoid creating an insurgency. The pessimism within the
Administration that the campaign would fail stemmed from history, the geography, and
the sense of being unprepared for such a mission.82 There was also the sense that given
these factors, if the US wanted to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda, there would need to be a
heavy engagement. Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders saw the use of airpower in the 1990s
and share the sentiments of many American policymakers thinking that it was an
overrated strategy and that the US would need to use large numbers of troops to fight in
Afghanistan and in this scenario, they felt emboldened.83 This perspective attempts to
legitimize the strength of airpower relative to other military strategies, but as will be
discussed in depth later. It is not about the mere capability of airpower, it is using it
selectively against a certain type of enemy, principally against a conventional force, not
one that espouses the tactics of an insurgency.
Anecdotal Discussion about the Afghan Model
The opening maneuvers of the War in Afghanistan and Operation Enduring
Freedom provide numerous stories and characters that could turn into an action movie,
but reveling detracts from learning and drawing conclusions about strategy. It is
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important and necessary to examine and inspect some accounts so that conclusions about
the applicability of the Afghan Model can be made.
Tora Bora
The Battle of Tora Bora, the engagement that is known as when bin-Laden
slipped away from American forces. This happened despite the availability of the full
might of the US Air Force, numerous special forces units, and being surrounded by
indigenous allies. One would expect to be a rousing success given the readily available
airpower and numerous Afghan allies. The explanation, as it often is when military
operations come up short, is that politicians let down the soldiers. Many such as former
Delta Force operator and writer, Dalton Fury, believe that had they had more American
forces, the outcome would have been different.84 To secure such rugged terrain though,
would have required hundreds of troops, something that was logistically impossible.
While it is true that more troops would have, the Afghan Model’s goal is to use as few
American forces as possible and as Crumpton notes General Franks had a vision of
indigenous Afghans serving as the primary ground force for the mission with US support.
It was important to integrate and coordinate with the different groups and keep the
coalition together.85 This means that politics and alliance making is crucial to the Afghan
Model. Indigenous groups have their own policy visions and the relationship exists if it is
mutually beneficial.
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The use of indigenous allies also requires careful balancing to not favor one group
over another to avoid stoking ethnic conflict. Pashtun groups that were not allied with the
Taliban were included in the Battle for Tora Bora to prevent a north-south conflict from
defining the post-Taliban political landscape. One of these groups was the small nonPashtun Pashai tribe which from the Jalalabad area, which had fought with the Northern
Alliance against the Taliban. Its senior commander, General Hazrat Ali, was given
command of the Tora Bora operation. Despite his Northern Alliance background,
however, Hazrat Ali seems to have played an equivocal and indeed obstructive role
because he was given a hefty bribe of $300,000 by bin Laden.86 Instead of pressing the
fight and completing the destruction of Taliban forces tribal and personal rivalries
complicated the situation the incomplete success at Tora Bora was due to the complex
relationship between American and NA US forces. Rivalries between the various militia
groups created rifts in the alliance and made command and control difficult. In fact,
diplomacy became the primary means of persuading the Afghan chieftains to work
together and move toward a common purpose. Airpower cannot solve these types of
political problems on the ground.
Furthermore, at some points in the battle, diplomatic skills were not enough to
keep the alliance together and the individual leaders began acting unilaterally. Given the
poor relations between the two primary commanders, Ali and Zaman, it is somewhat
surprising that operations went as well as they did because of the jockeying for political
position in the alliance.87 The opportunities that al-Qaeda were given to surrender88
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demonstrates that the Afghan Model does not exist in a political vacuum, nor does it
follow a linear path. It is plain that lifting this strategy and implanting it onto other
campaigns will have significant issues. That is why I hypothesize that the Afghan Model
is better utilized against a middle tier conventional army fielded by a nation-state because
it is much less likely to be hindered by tribal allegiances.
Mazar e Sharif
The capabilities of the Afghan Model and airpower were displayed in the battle of
Mazar e Sharif, but it also showed that the Afghan Model should be used in more
conventional situations. Also, it demonstrates that when choosing allies, it is preferable to
partner with one group at a time to avoid political complications. This allowed the
synergy between a cohesive political mission, ground forces for airpower to exploit.
Mazar e Sharif was viewed as a valuable strategic location as a logistical center.89 In
early November, eager to secure the city and the airfields before winter set in, special
forces and Northern Alliance units had two 15,000-pound BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” bombs
dropped from a cargo plane on the Taliban position.90 Although, an extreme example, it
“epitomized the US military’s ability to make a huge impact on the battlefield with a
small force.91” Schroen also argues that, airpower proved decisive in enabling the
Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban in northern Afghanistan in 2001.92 This was a
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more conventional situation, which created a situation where the synergy between the
ground and air could be exploited without interference of tribal politics.
Many also point to a well-coordinated cavalry charge at Mazar e Sharif as another
example of this phenomenon.93 US and Northern Alliance forces planned to break a
resilient Taliban line using air strikes on the Taliban frontline followed by a charge from
Northern Alliance cavalrymen. There was some misunderstanding about the exact timing
of the air strikes, so the Northern Alliance began their charge right as the bombs landed,
“emerged, literally, out of the smoke, riding down on the enemy through clouds of dust
and flying shrapnel. A few carried RPGs, some had less than ten rounds of ammunition in
their guns-but they rode boldly--Americans and Afghans--into tank, mortar, artillery and
sniper fire”. 94 This dichotomy of the conduct of war gives an impression of
invulnerability, but when one looks past the excitement of the story, it becomes apparent
that this occurred because it was used in a particular range of conflict.
Debating the Afghan Model
The use of special forces fighting alongside indigenous forces, combined with
airpower has been dubbed the “Afghan Model”.95 There is a divergence of opinion on
who deserves the credit and how revolutionary this new type of warfare is. Some like
Andres, Wills, and Griffith argue that the vast technological and operational leaps within
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the US military made airpower and a handful of special operations forces just as deadly,
yet more efficient than multiple divisions of ground forces.96 They argue that this strategy
should be utilized more frequently to avoid over extension and the appearance of
imperialism.
Moreover, the Afghan Model could redefine US foreign policy, according to this
argument. Hostile regimes could be toppled and replaced in a matter of months, rapidly
reshaping world order and tipping the international balance of power even more towards
the US. The perspective that believes the Afghan Model is a revolutionary leap forward
suggest that airpower, special forces, and indigenous troops, even those with relatively
little training, form a powerful and robust combination.97 They believe that the Afghan
Model is repeatable because airpower is so overwhelming of defending forces, like the
Taliban, that they cannot mount any sustainable defense. Also, the destructive capabilities
of airpower negate any potential lack of technical military skills from the allies in
question. Again, the Afghan model uses “U.S. airpower to degrade enemy
communications throughout the theater of war. Then, U.S. special forces use light
indigenous troops as a screen against enemy infantry and force the enemy to mass before
calling in precision air strikes.”98
They also argue that airpower is so effective because the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance had been deadlocked in a stalemate for so long. Once American firepower
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became part of the equation, the stalemate broke in favor of the American-backed
Northern Alliance. It presents a conundrum of concentrating to defend the ground assault
or dispersing to hide from airpower. Andres, Wills, and Griffith point to news reports and
commentary from experts in late October of 2001 that cast doubt on the course of the
war. The media began to use terms such as “stalemate” and “quagmire” to describe the
conflict. Robert Pape, the famed airpower theorist and historian even suggested that the
reliance on airpower may not be working.99
On October 21st, 2001, special forces called in close air support as part of the
Northern Alliance effort to capture Mazar-e-Sharif. The sequence of events and the rapid
improvement once airpower and special forces were teamed up prove to the proponents
that the Afghan Model is a paradigm altering strategy. They argue once airpower entered
the equation, the Taliban’s forces were now confronted with the choice of concentrating
their forces to fight or dispersing to avoid detection. If they dispersed, they would be
overrun. If they concentrated, then air strikes would make quick work of them.
Proponents further point to more successes once special forces and airpower were
teamed up, the Taliban quickly lost ground through November given that Bai Beche was
captured on the fifth, Mazar-e-Sharif on the tenth, Kabul on the thirteenth, and Kunduz
on the twenty-sixth of October. Given the lightning advance through a variety of terrains
with little logistical support, it would appear as if this new military strategy could do
away with an entire military tradition.
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An Expansive Perspective of the Afghan Model
Andres, Wills, and Griffith point to the synergy between airpower, special forces,
and indigenous forces as the source of the potency of the Afghan Model. This is not
problematic until proponents assign it a strategic value and argue that it can answer any
strategic problem presented in military foreign policy. They argue that “… the Afghan
model has proven capable of defeating both conventional and guerrilla forces. When the
proxy forces' limitations are recognized and considered in planning operations, the model
is replicable under substantially different conditions and has shown itself to work even
when less skilled proxy forces are deployed against more skilled enemies and when
proxy forces have little or no political motivation to fight for U.S. goals. Examining only
the tactical issues associated with the new model, however, obscures its true value.”100
In fact, the Afghan Model’s performance dropped significantly when Taliban and
al-Qaeda fighters adopted hit and run tactics compared to the days of early October when
the Taliban had established front lines and when the political situation became
ambiguous. One need look no further than the Battle of Tora Bora.
The claim is that the synergy between airpower, special forces, and indigenous
forces, regardless of skill or political allegiance, is too much for any adversary to
overcome. Another important claim that the trio claim is that the organization of the
enemy is irrelevant to the outcome. They argue this is the case because the Afghan Model
allows the US military to bring the most violent physical systems at little relative cost to
the nation as whole. That is not to diminish the sacrifice of US service members, but
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rather a comparison to conflicts that utilized large numbers of ground forces, like in
Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, it allows US forces and indigenous
allies to take risks that larger conventional forces could not take.101 Secondly, they argue
that because large numbers of American forces were not on the ground, an insurgency did
not develop. This has proved not to be true for reasons entirely unrelated to the Afghan
Model.
In summation, the proponents argue that “planners must consider the model as a
primary option, rather than an emergency procedure”.102 This conclusion is faulty
because it disregards the balance of skill between allies and enemies, but also it ignores
the overall conflict intensity and type.
A Limited Perspective on the Afghan Model
The Afghan Model is not a revolution and it is not a “one size fits all” military
strategy. Obviously, the Afghan Model will not succeed against a near-peer rival as
Andres, Wills, and Griffith admit.103 It is only a new operational concept in a specific
range of conflict intensity and political reality. 104 It also requires at least somewhat
skilled allies. I concur with Biddle’s conclusion that allies need skill and political
motivation, but I also argue that there is a range of conflict intensity that the Afghan
Model will work in. Moreover, the Afghan Model should not be relied upon if an enemy
is likely to devolve into an insurgency, like the Taliban.
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Merely attaching any group to a special forces unit and expecting them to take
territory regardless of relative combat skill and experience is problematic. One of the
primary objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom was to topple the Taliban regime.
The Northern Alliance always had toeholds and there were always ethnic enclaves that
the Taliban could not reach. As discussed, it was a tactical stalemate. Pushing out of these
enclaves and toppling the Taliban requires advancing, taking, and holding territory and
that means allied forces must have skill parity. The crucial task of the NA was to take
ground from the Taliban. If taking ground were not necessary, then bombing alone would
be asked to carry out the mission and therefore the Afghan Model would be a moot
point.105 The situation called for a synergy between forces and without capable force on
the ground, the effort would have fallen flat.
Clearly, the Afghan Model has some characteristics of a barstool. If one leg is
significantly weaker than the other two, the stool will fall apart. It can only thrive in a
specific set of circumstances. As mentioned, the situation pre-2001 was defined by
stalemate. A stalemate means that the two sides are prepared positions, and either side on
the offensive would need the technical skills to solve that tactical puzzle. As Biddle
points out, taking ground requires some competency. One must utilize cover,
concealment, and suppression of the enemy to push forward. 106 Simply charging enemy
positions after bombardment does not guarantee success, as some might suggest. The
battlefields of the Western Front in the First World War can attest to this. Andres, Wills,
and Griffith argue that air strikes targeting reserves and supplies make defense
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impossible, but again if attacking allies lack basic skills and cannot advance, then an
attack on rear elements is a waste of expensive munitions. The course of the conflict also
demonstrates that the relative balance of skill between allies and foes does not show that
the Afghan Model can work across the conflict intensity spectrum.
The conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban and their al-Qaeda
partners did not feature two standardized, professional forces, but rather a mix of welltrained and motivated and untrained and poorly motivated combatants on each side.
Often, how they mixed and which groups came into contact determined outcomes, not
airpower. The Taliban forces were comprised of mostly Pashtun seasonal volunteers,
foreign fighters with some tactical skills, and the well-motivated foreigners who had
trained in Al-Qaeda camps. These fighters were often trained basic infantry skills and
used as such.107
The Northern Alliance had a similar construction. They often utilized young men
from their particular ethnic regions, but featured some veterans from the long civil war
that understood basic fire and maneuver skills.108 Obviously, their high-end forces
compromised American special forces units. When the Taliban put their least skilled
forces in the front, they did not pick concealed positions and thus, they were easily
identified.109 One example personifies this phenomenon at the fighting around Bishqab in
late October 2001, when NA commanders witness positions that had checked every
attack against it was vaporized by a 2,000-pound bomb.110
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Clearly, the Afghan Model works well against amateurs, but things changed once
the war progressed and the Taliban put the well-trained Al-Qaeda volunteers into forward
positions. Infantry forces that stand against the horizon on hilltops are easy to spot
without advanced imaging devices, but the Taliban adopted cover and concealment
techniques and dispersal strategies by November 2001. The devastating effects of
American air strikes were minimized and this became apparent during the attack on Tora
Bora and Operation Anaconda. 111
This demonstrates that there is a military skill ceiling for the Afghan Model and
given that more experienced fighters that had received basic training could hold their
ground even facing heavy bombardment.112 Also, when the Taliban behaved as a
conventional force would, holding a specific line, they were vulnerable to air strikes.
When they behaved as an insurgency, airpower was less effective. Some, like Wright
attribute this to technical limitations, claiming that technological improvements in
surveillance with the onset of UAVs, which provided quicker reaction times and longer
loiter times than manned platforms. The Taliban could be under nearly continuous
surveillance and thus faster tasking for airstrikes. 113 This still does not mean that
American forces had total control because certain effective Taliban elements held ground
in multiple instances.
Moreover, the hope that the final technical revolution is just around the corner has
always been the claim, yet systems fail, radios break, or something is caught up in the fog
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of war. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, the battlefield was a ten-by-tenkilometer area focused on with every available surveillance asset, yet fewer than half of
al-Qaeda positions were identified prior to ground engagement. Most fire that US forces
encountered came from unseen positions that Western ground forces had to deal with in
close quarters engagements. 114 Operation Enduring Freedom also failed to achieve one of
the primary objectives, the capture or death of Osama bin-Laden. It is impossible to ask
special forces to call in air support and maintain a perimeter around rugged, mountainous
terrain is an impossible task and relying on Afghan militias, who may not share the same
political objectives as the US.115 Understanding the effectiveness of the Afghan Model
goes far beyond technological capabilities. It involves the balance of forces and a range
of conflict intensity.
Conclusions About the Invasion of Afghanistan
The Afghan Model is not a one-off, but it most certainly is not a paradigm altering
strategy. As the successes of the early days of the campaign and certain failures at Tora
Bora and Operation Anaconda reveal truths beyond the standard debate about the
preconditions that the Afghan Model requires. Yes, the political allegiance and relative
skill of allies is important, but the Afghan Model can only work in a certain range of
conflict intensity and against certain enemies. At the far right of the intensity range is a
nuclear exchange and at the far left are limited guerrilla activities on a local scale. To
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reiterate, the Afghan Model will not work against a near-peer rival in a high intensity
conflict.
The War in Afghanistan is an interesting case because it had elements of
conventional and unconventional conflict, which is why occasionally, the synergy
between airpower, special forces, and indigenous allies proved to be an unstoppable force
against previously impenetrable Taliban lines. When the more experienced Taliban and
al-Qaeda members adopted more tactics one would associate with an insurgency, the
Afghan Mode proved less effective, like the fighting on Highway 4 in December of 2011
and at Tora Bora.116 Andres, Wills, and Griffith and other proponents of the Afghan
Model are correct in stating that conventional forces are vulnerable because they have
exposed reserves and supply lines. They are incorrect in the assertion that that the mere
addition of precision airpower into the equation changes the outcome of the conflict. As
demonstrated, when trained forces utilized cover and concealment, airpower was much
less effective. The forces that used cover and concealment were veteran Taliban and alQaeda fighters were the ones that fled into Pakistan and formed the seeds of the
insurgency that persists today. Using airpower without a major ground effort against a
side that is likely to disperse and transform into an insurgency, which airpower is not
suited to fight against. The Taliban and al-Qaeda wanted to draw the US into a larger
conflict and use the same strategies that they did against the Soviets, which explains their
use of cover and concealment beyond a mere tactical advantage. They are primarily a
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guerrilla group and airpower cannot effectively target such a strategy. The Model works
well against conventional forces and that is the way it should be utilized.
Using the Afghan Model on low-to-middle range conventional adversaries makes
the most strategic sense for the United States. Conventional forces, created by a nationstate, are easier to target and special forces are more adept at direct action and other
mission types against set objectives and pieces of military infrastructure. It is also easier
to organize a united front of indigenous allies against a conventional force. Conventional
forces fielded by a nation-state are likely to not create the conflicting ethnic interests that
caused problems at Tora Bora and during Operation Anaconda.
The Afghan Model demonstrated that in the right situation and against the right
adversary, the synergy between airpower and ground forces “demonstrated a level of
flexibility, accuracy, and power exceeding any previous war.”117 Yet, overemphasizing
technology and targeting, will distract from the real lessons of the conflict. 118 When the
Taliban and al-Qaeda adopted insurgency-like tactics, airpower became much less
effective. Yet, earlier in the conflict, when the Taliban used conventional tactics, the
Northern Alliance could take advantage of the tactical conundrum of concentrating to
fight or dispersing to avoid air strikes. The fight went better when the complex tribal
politics were left out of the equation when it was one group fighting against another
instead of putting different groups in situations that would test their allegiances. I
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hypothesize that the Afghan Model should only be used against middle tier, conventional
foes. This would also alleviate the political conundrum. In part because the US would not
need to work as hard to get basing or flyover rights and because it is easier to choose
allies against a state as opposed to an ethnic group. Moreover, this should not be
considered a transformative event for defense politics because it is geared to small
nation-states, which do not pose a major threat to American interests. If American
defense posture is geared to a major power conflict, then conducting a war in the image
of the Afghan Model will be less complicated.

Chapter Four: Comparing Kosovo and Libya
In the absence of another great power to challenge the United States since the fall
of the Soviet Union, the US has been free to use its military muscle to maintain
international order. Airpower has been the preferred tool for multiple administrations as it
is more politically palatable than putting American soldiers on the ground. The Kosovo
and Libya air campaigns bear much in similar, despite being twelve years apart. They
were both joint US/European operations that targeted authoritarian regimes under the
auspice of humanitarian intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing.
There are claims that Kosovo was a unanimous victory for airpower, but there are
numerous skeptics. Skeptics argue that airpower did not change Milosevic’s mind, but
harmed civilians, which was against the objective of the mission. Libya is often
denounced for uncorking civil strife and disorder within Libya. I disagree with these
sentiments because the use of airpower was about shaping the regional order to fit into
the Western vision, led by the United States. The realist perspective of international
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relations advises that one examine conflict as a state versus state affair. Intervention and
the use of airpower did not necessarily change the political calculus of either Ghaddafi or
Milosevic, but it changed their political realities. Expecting authoritarian leaders to bend
at the first sight of American intervention would be a foolish assumption. Airpower was
not the exacting tool it was advertised to be. Political control comes from the people and
airpower does not gain hegemony over a population.
The use of airpower in both situations was to facilitate a regime change and from
this perspective, each was a limited success, because ultimately the regime fell. The
overarching question, which goes beyond the scope of this paper, is does America want
this to be its primary strategy of coercive foreign policy? What could have changed the
outcomes of both campaigns was picking a different moment to intervene. Perhaps if a
more established and unified opposition to Ghaddafi rose quickly, then the outcome
would be radically different. Airpower should not be viewed as a solution in statecraft,
but a mechanism. Airpower was used to create political instability, so future campaigns
against such regimes ought to target what legitimizes their power and existence. Anarchy
is what one makes of it.
In this chapter, I first examine the origins of the Kosovo conflict. It is necessary to
understand the circumstances around Operation Allied Force (OAF). Understanding these
circumstances is necessary to evaluating the outcome in Kosovo. Then, I will examine
the arguments surrounding the Kosovo intervention. Subsequently, I will discuss the
historical similarities between the Kosovo and Libya campaigns and interpret their
significance. Finally, I will determine how successful the Libya campaign was in
comparison to Kosovo.
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Origins of Kosovo Conflict
Kosovo is a landlocked country with no strategic resources, which begs the
question, why was Serbia bent on keeping it? Kosovo is considered to be cradle of the
Serbian nation and identity, but changing demographics put the Serbian claim of
ownership at risk. 119 The Kosovar Albanian population was steadily increasing, while the
Serbian population was decreasing, especially in the Kosovo province. Politics cannot
change demographics and the shifting balance in favor of the Albanians would threaten
the established political order for Milosevic. To this end, he limited the rights of
Albanians to encourage migration as an artificial balance against the changing
demographics.120
Consequently, Kosovar Albanians organized to move towards referendum
through peaceful means. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova organized a referendum that showed an
overwhelming majority desired Kosovar independence and adopted a strategy of nonviolence in the spirit of Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. They believed this would
gain international attention and pressure Milosevic into change.121 In response, Milosevic
cracked down harder on Kosovo and consequently, the peace movement lost sway to a
more militant wing.
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The Milosevic regime in Belgrade can be described as “soft authoritarian”.122
Post-Soviet Yugoslavia had some elements of democracy, but without the veto points of a
well-developed democracy.123 The elections that legitimized his rule were competitive,
but not fair.124 He utilized constitutional rules that allowed him to bypass a popular
election in favor of a legislative vote to extend his presidency to a third term and this
adherence to constitutionalism, although minimal, made the regime fragile.125
Many point to the Dayton Accords as the birth of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) because these accords affirmed Milosevic’s authority, which therefore denied
Rugova’s pacifist strategy.126 The KLA instead adopted violence. Formed in 1991, it only
gained serious traction in 1996 after the Dayton Accords. As a separatist group, its means
of waging war against another state was minimal, but the theft of light weaponry made a
small insurgency possible.127 The KLA captured a third of the province by attacking
lightly defended police stations. The US government considered the KLA to be a terror
group and a disruptor to order in the region, as Milosevic was viewed as the “guarantor of
peace” in the region. 128 Already it is apparent that the US viewed Balkan instability as a
threat to order that needed a solution. Moreover, the KLA was a weak group that could
not alter the political realities on their own. Even at the end of the conflict, when Serbian
forces were weaker than at the beginning, the KLA still posed no real threat to the
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Serbian military. The KLA did not have one recorded offensive military success. 129 So, to
garner international attention, they would need to draw in the Serbian military. They
accomplished this and achieved international recognition when Serbian forces committed
atrocities in Racak, where the bodies of 45 farmers, including children were
uncovered.130
It is necessary to understand Milosevic’s strategy if one wants to evaluate the
coercive nature of the air campaign. The demographic realities meant that if Milosevic
wanted to keep control of the province, demographics would need to change. The way a
state can do this is through ethnic cleansing. From a military perspective, ethnic cleansing
is not a taxing operation. It only requires lightly armed soldiers or militiamen to evict
people from their homes and herd them away. The KLA attacks gave Milosevic the
reason to go into Kosovo and conduct ethnic cleansing and do it under the international
principle of sovereignty because he would argue that he was putting down a rebellion in
his own territory. Also, Milosevic was putting down a rebellion, not trying to win the
political favor of the Kosovars. It was not possible to repress a majority ethnic group, so
instead of attempting to separate the population from the guerillas, as basic counterinsurgency doctrine dictates, Milosevic wanted to remove the Kosovars and regain the
demographic advantage. 131 In short, the Serbian objective was to retain Kosovo. The
strategy to achieve this was to eliminate the KLA as a force that could harm Serbian
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interests and to remake the ethnic balance in Kosovo. 132The Serbian strategy was to deny
the KLA any local sources of support because if the insurgency were left to fester, a
potential Kosovar Albanian state could arise and present perpetual conflict.133 It is widely
known that conflict begets the exodus of people, so the Serbs hoped a US/NATO
intervention would help accelerate the exodus. The objective was to create a situation in
Kosovo would not pose a reasonable threat to Serb interest and Kosovo to remain
docile.134
NATO’s Perspective
At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance designed to deter major conflict
between the Soviets and allied Europe. But on the 50th anniversary of the alliance’s
formation, the Soviet Union no longer existed and the new Russian Federation did not
pose a threat to Europe. If NATO proved inept at preventing the same actions such as
packing women and children into trains to be shipped away that denoted the Holocaust,
then what was the point of the organization existing anyways? In the post-Soviet world,
NATO would also need to prove that it could still be a credible actor against aggression
as it was formed as a defensive alliance against the Soviets. The alliance also needed to
prove they could still credibly wield their collective saber. NATO hoped to use airpower
to coerce Milosevic that achieving his goal was impossible and that continuing the ethnic
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cleansing would be counterproductive for his regime. The track to conflict was set into
place.
Operation Allied Force
The Clinton Administration’s stated objectives for the use of airpower in Kosovo
were: “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression, deter
Milosevic’s continuing and escalating attacks in Kosovo, and to damage Serbia’s
capacity to wage war in the future”.135 NATO needed to maintain its credibility as an
alliance and as the main force of stabilization in the region. This clearly shows that the
mission was not about humanitarian intervention, but rather regional order. The stated
objectives are all framed in a way that pertains to state conflict. This influences how one
should consider the success of the use of airpower. Airpower, as a strategy, serves this
end well because it does not entail decisive military action.136 It changes the political
realities of other regimes and actors. The end goal of the use of force was, without doubt,
to weaken the Milosevic regime because undercutting the capacity to wage war also
hinders the capacity for the monopoly on violence, the Weberian definition of statehood.
Attacks on the elements of stability in a developing state can be coercive because
internal security is often the primary concern of these regimes. 137 NATO ultimately
accomplished this, not through attacks on the military, but on Milosevic’s supporters. The
goal of the use of airpower was to make Belgrade end their aggressive actions at the
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negotiating table.138 As history has shown, the Kosovars returned to their homes,
Milosevic came to the bargaining table, and his regime ultimately collapsed. Milosevic
proved himself to be a serious barrier to regional stability and a threat to NATO unity in
terms of Greco-Turkish competition, so the campaign was successful.
Gen. Klaus Naumann, who chaired the NATO alliance's military committee,
declared NATO's intention "to loosen his grip on power and break his will to
continue."139 Stating that the objective was to “loosen his grip on power” clearly indicates
that human rights were in the background and that this was a mission to facilitate regime
change. From this perspective, the operation was successful.
Proponent Arguments
As stated in the introduction, I do not argue that airpower alone forced Milosevic
and the Serbians to stand down. This too was the case for Qaddafi in Libya in 2011.
Instead, I offer that this campaign was a limited success because it created an untenable
situation for Milosevic to survive politically if he chose to continue, which does fall in
line with statements made by US and NATO officials. Classical understanding of
airpower, which theorizes that airpower alone can determine the political outcome,
categorizes airpower into three categories: punishment, denial, and decapitation. Lake,
among others, argues that these categories do not conceptualize airpower properly. I
concur that the classical categorization of airpower into punishment, denial, and
decapitation do not sufficiently comprehend the political realities surrounding the use of
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airpower140. Punishment is the attempt to bomb civilian areas with the objective of
inciting a revolt or collapse of the will to fight. Denial targets the military of an enemy
state, rendering them incapable of defense and therefore susceptible to an enemy state’s
will. Decapitation refers to attacking leadership elements141. I also argue that the new
categories are only useful when understood as part of a comprehensive strategy
The proponents of the Kosovo campaign argue that the air campaign was
undermining his political support among the elites that supported the regime.142.
Although Lake is a skeptic of airpower in Kosovo, he demonstrates its limited success.
He argues that the denial strategy, targeting Milosevic’s was a failure. Instead, he argues
that the direct pressure, which threatens constituents and their property, combined with
weakening, the threats to prosperity of the state143, were what caused Milosevic to
capitulate. Targeting these specific nodes of his power structure changed his political
reality and forced him to end the attacks on Kosovo.
It is necessary to understand what parts of the Milosevic regime were attacked to
hypothesize about the overall effectiveness of airpower as a tool of foreign policy. One
needs to categorize the different uses of airpower on a strategic level to evaluate it. The
new typology Lake introduces carries great significance for understanding the
consequences of the conflict and airpower. The typology that Lake uses144 includes
denial, direct pressure, weakening, and political destabilization. Denial utilizes threats to
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“make it difficult, if not impossible, for the target to achieve its objectives”.145 The
objective is to make the target reconsider its political objectives.146. Denial seeks to
degrade the military capabilities of an enemy state’s military capabilities to make
achieving an objective impossible, thus altering the political reality.147 Some argue that
Milosevic capitulated because of a threat of a US/NATO ground action, but there was
little real political momentum from the US or other NATO partners.148 The Clinton
Administration routinely came out against ground action and Congress required its
authorization before ground forces could be used.149 The US military was also weary of
getting bogged down into the Yugoslav mountains, which stymied the Germans for
years.150. Also, an assault on Belgrade would put civilian at risk, when airpower would
not put US ground forces at risk. The use of a denial strategy would include the
reasonable threat of ground forces, for which there is no credible evidence, according to
Lake.
Direct pressure threatens to place costs on the enemy state’s leadership as a way
to change the calculus of its policy.151 NATO did not seriously pursue attacks on
Milosevic. The only instance of attacking his person was an early April airstrike on a
residence he used, but other command, control, communications, and intelligence
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outposts were part of the sortie.152 This target list further demonstrates that the objective
was to weaken Milosevic’s capacity for control and the consequence would be his ouster.
Also, avoiding targeting Milosevic directly also shows a confidence that targeting his
other sources of power would facilitate his capitulation and political demise.
Lake proposes that weakening “relies on the threats if aggregate damage to a
state’s national prosperity and power to convince the target leadership to change
policy”153. Attacking a state’s economic means of function does more than chip away at
the means of building a war machine. When people are put out of work and daily lives
are disrupted, then support for the leadership can be eroded. Then, the regime may lose
the confidence of the people and collapse. When NATO and US attacks on Serbian
infrastructure after the initial attacks on pure military infrastructure did not produce the
desired result, the target list expanded to mixed civilian infrastructure.
The Serbian military was conducting ethnic cleansing, which does not require the
use of heavy, easily identifiable forces. Rather it requires just light infantry. The US and
NATO made quick work of the significant military infrastructure like command and
control elements and airfields. 154 In fact, final estimates conclude that only 7-10% of the
heavy Serbian forces in Kosovo were destroyed. 155When this occurred, it put over
100,000 civilians out of work when their places of employment were destroyed and
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500,000 more lost their jobs because they were subcontracted. 156Clearly, Milosevic was
more susceptible to the collapse of popular support rather than a military defeat. Kosovo
was the poorest province in Yugoslavia and the general population’s suffering for a
province that did not serve a strategic benefit or economic one would quickly change
public opinion about Milosevic.
Sanctions had already done significant harm to the Serbian economy, but what
changed was who the bombing affected As Lake notes, Milosevic was not concerned
about the damage to the military because Serbia faced no external threats, but economic
damage did concern him. 157 The Serbian economy was an oligarchy and the elites of
society had control of most the economy and therefore they supported his regime and the
threats to their prosperity did threaten him.158 One such example of this was in May of
1999, NATO attacked the Serbian electrical grid with CBU-102 bombs designed to
destroy the grid systems and then later attacked the generation stations.159 This lowered
Serbia’s economic output 50% after the war.160 This would directly affect his backers and
make them question supporting him. The use of airpower did not directly bend Milosevic,
but it clearly created a situation where his regime was no longer tenable.
The fourth and final category, destabilization is what Lake credits with the
undoing of the Milosevic regime. Destabilization “threatens a leader’s ability to retain
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power”.161The older airpower doctrine would classify it as punishment and NATO’s
targeting of the non-military economic pieces of Milosevic’s regime fits this category
well. Milosevic relied on Serbian economic elites of about 100 families for support in the
legislatures and when the NATO bombing began to destroy their wealth for a cause they
did not fervently believe in, the Milosevic regime began to unravel. After the initial
bombing on the Serbian military did not force him to change strategy, the target list was
opened up to include the Serbian economy. 162 After a month, through May of 1999,
“elite discontent became visible”.163
The economic elites had no stake in Kosovo, yet were suffering greatly from
Milosevic’s actions there. Concurrently, NATO tightened ranks about the need for
Milosevic to go and Russia punted on Milosevic having any further backing. 164 This
weakening fed into political destabilization.
Although OAF did not intentionally seek to undermine Milosevic through
attacking his political support, it did. The use of airpower created a situation where
Milosevic could no longer maintain his legitimacy not because he was weakened
militarily, but because his political support fell out. It helped that Russia obfuscated on
his diplomatic support, but the key mechanism that buckled under airpower was his
economic support. Airpower was not successful in Kosovo because it simply shocked
Milosevic into capitulation. He remarked to US diplomats that “you will bomb us”.

161

Lake, 99. Byman and Waxman; The Dynamics of Coercion, pp. 65-76.
Lake, 108
163
Lake, 108
164
Lake, 110
162

77

Ultimately, airpower created an untenable situation for his rule to continue and a similar
pattern occurs in Libya.
Kosovo Dissent
Dynamic and exciting technology often fails to live up to its promises and some
argue that Milosevic’s capitulation had nothing to do with US/NATO bombing, but rather
it was the. Some, like Conrad Crane, argue that the bombing of dual-use facilities did not
pressure Milosevic and failed to coerce as intended. 165 At the onset of OAF, the Clinton
Administration expected airpower to destroy Milosevic’s forces, thus curtailing the
ability to conduct ethnic cleansing.
Given that the target list had to be expanded to include dual-use facilities,
airpower could not fulfill its promises. This postulation mistakes the nature of
Milosevic’s strategy and the desired outcome. Again, ethnic cleansing does not require a
massive military effort, so it is difficult to pick apart from the air. Given that there were
only 26 tanks were to have been confirmed destroyed, many point to this as a failure of
airpower. 166 The decision to use force and the continued use of force represents an
attempt to undercut the Milosevic regime. Given that he threatened Greco-Turkish
stability within NATO and the overall stability of the region, it was an assault on the
overall stability of Belgrade. 167
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Crane argues that “The Kosovo campaign thus featured anew many of the
persistent shortcomings of American airpower. Gauging the decision-making process,
vulnerabilities and will of targeted leaders again proved difficult”.168 Given that NATO
went after the economic base, it is clear that removing Milosevic was the ultimate
objective. A state does not attack another’s base of power unless it means to facilitate
political collapse. There is also the persisting claim about the Clinton Doctrine and that
the war was about humanitarian norms.169
Dissenters, like Crane, also point to the threat of a US/NATO invasion and
diplomatic efforts that ultimately pushed Milosevic to end his operations in Kosovo.
They also argue that the strategy of imposed costs and destruction of dual use facilities
were not the deciding factors, as others, including then Pentagon spokesman Kenneth
Bacon and other academics claim. 170 Perhaps dissidents are too distracted by the claims
of bloodless war and even as Crane readily admits, “bombs destroy bridges, not build
them”.171 The intent of stopping ethnic cleansing was noble, but as the realist paradigm
directs observers to look past these explanations and understand conflict as the affair of
nation-states.
The most frequently cited alternative explanation to airpower is the threat of a
US/NATO invasion. 172 Serbian GNP had been cut in half through the decade preceding
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OAF, so they could not be further damaged. This does not take into account that the
economy was geared towards elites and once their sources of income were damaged or
destroyed, then their political support of Milosevic would crumble. At the time, the US
and UK deployed 35,000 troops to Albania and began work on widening supply roads
there. The UK also called up 30,000 reservists.173 Pape points to the evidence that Russia
attempted to put Russian soldiers in Serbia as a deterrent to NATO action, but the fact
that it never occurred is argued as proof that the Russians took the NATO threat
seriously. This runs counter to statements that then Secretary of State Madeline Albright
made to the Republican members of Congress that “I can assure you that the United
States would not support ground options”.174 Also, before the bombing began at the
Rambouillet Conference, there was no mention of a US/NATO ground action. 175
Russia’s decision to withdraw diplomatic support for Milosevic is also an oft cited
reason for Milosevic to capitulate. As Hosmer points out, Russia had been Serbia’s
principle ally, but abandoned it and sided with the NATO position. When this occurred,
on June 2, Russian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin, made this clear and Milosevic ceased
operations within several hours. 176 Some argue that this is additional proof to the
credibility of the US/NATO invasion because Yeltsin would be sacrificing a staunch ally
in an important region, thus signaling Russian impotence in the new world order. 177 This
is despite statements from US elected officials and General Wesley Clark that the air war
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"was an effort to coerce, not to seize”178. Moreover, it was never mentioned during
negotiations in private back-channel communications with State Department officials.179
Finally, it is more likely that the Russians merely viewed Milosevic as no longer worth
the effort or diplomatic risk. Milosevic endorsed a coup against Gorbachev in 1991,
which reportedly soured his relationship with Yeltsin.180 Milosevic was getting in the
way of moving past the Cold War and into a new era between the US and Russia.
Milosevic ran out of allies as he reneged on promises too many times. 181 The decision
was made to use airpower to unseat Milosevic because he threatened order in the region.
Libya and Operation Odyssey Dawn
When the Arab Spring kicked off with revolution in Tunisia in December 2010,
the desire for political change swept across the region. The calls for change and
expressions of discontent spread to and metastasized within Libya. These calls for
freedom and reform posed a threat to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. The ensuing
protest turned to revolt, which threatened his regime. Qaddafi threatened to cleanse those
who opposed him. The air campaigns against Milosevic and Serbia and Qaddafi and
Libya bear much in common. They were both soft authoritarian regimes seeking to quash
a threat to their rule and legitimacy that were undone by a US/NATO air campaign. The
situations surrounding the respective campaigns and the similar final outcomes have
implications for the use of airpower as a military-political strategy. Without airpower in
either situation, Qaddafi and Milosevic, would have conducted an ethnic cleansing and
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would probably have remained in power for the foreseeable future. The humanitarian
aspects of the campaigns were not the primary motivators for intervention given the
outcomes of Milosevic losing an election and Qaddafi’s death.
Qaddafi had long drawn the ire of the US and NATO given the Lockerbie
bombing and the Berlin nightclub bombing that killed several American service members
that was tied Qaddafi and precipitated airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi.182 By 2011,
Qaddafi was the last standing threat to American and European interests in the region and
the longstanding desire to remove him appeared and was given urgency because of his
promise to massacre civilians. In both cases, the air campaigns represented an
opportunity to reshape regional order. Without the Soviet Union backing Egypt and other
regimes in the region, the US and NATO had an opportunity to solidify their presence in
North Africa.
Airpower was an effective strategy because it sought a limited objective of
delegitimizing and undercutting the respective regimes, Kosovo and Libya, showing that
an alternative path was preferable. Airpower is a limited tool and it presented a way to
engage in a limited political objective. The same categories of coercion can be used to
examine both cases. They had limited success because they both sought to achieve
limited objectives, deposing a regime. The criticism of unsettled and ongoing political
chaos, particularly in Libya fall outside the objectives of the missions. It was a limited
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objective without foresight about the political future in part because of the calls for
democracy.183
Qaddafi Regime
Qaddafi headed a single party regime. Libya was a republic ruled in a dictatorial
fashion by a president. The leadership often comes from the military and Qaddafi often
used his colonel title as a source of legitimacy. Some attributes that define a single party
regime was the growth of state power, the capacity to repress, quasi-socialist economics,
and the power of populism. In both states, the power of the state was vastly stronger than
that of civil society. Also, both states had the capacity to quash any uprising given the
pervasive paramilitary and secret police units. State control also extended into the
economies of both countries and cases In Libya, it was the oil revenues and in Milosevic
it came to be in the awarding of contracts to a handful of families to buy support. Finally,
both relied on populism to gain and hold power. Qaddafi claimed that he worked for the
people’s power and Milosevic railed against bureaucracy in earlier stages of his political
career.184 Although they went about their politics in different ways, they ended up at
similar places on the spectrum. The regimes bear important similarities, which means
they could be coerced similarly
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Move to War
Qaddafi lost all regional support when the Arab League endorsed the proposed
no-fly zone on March 12.185 This is the primary difference between Milosevic and
Qaddafi because Qaddafi was isolated from the beginning, whereas Milosevic had
Russia. In the end, they both ended without allies. Early in March, Qaddafi controlled
every city except Benghazi and was being reinforced by mercenaries.186 His speeches
about indiscriminate slaughter also stirred the desire for the US to intervene. He
threatened to put down the rebellion without mercy or pity.187 Mueller argues that it was
an opportunity to atone for previous missed opportunities to stop other genocides.188
This does not mesh into the history of the conflict. The US Ambassador to the
UN, Susan Rice proposed the language in UNSCR 1973, that called for “all necessary
measures to protect civilians”,189 but this was the legal justification for military action,
not the casus belli. The opportunity to knock over a weak Qaddafi regime and gain
stability in North Africa presented itself and the Administration wanted to take it. Russia
argued this point, but did not exercise its veto power.190 Beyond this, the US now had
legal backing to use airpower under the auspice of preventing ethnic cleansing. As Owen
puts it, “the US had a moral imperative and an opportunity to close a festering sore”. 191 It
was significantly more important to remove Qaddafi, the festering sore, and thus remove
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the future threat of instability from the perspective of a having a hostile state in an
important region.
American Strategy for Qaddafi
Qaddafi’s political strength and legitimacy came from the ability of his military
and security services to keep order in Libya. What differentiates the Libya and Kosovo
interventions were the centers of gravity targeted, but they had the same effect of political
destabilization. The Libyan rebels were completely outclassed and would be annihilated
in any conflict against Qaddafi’s forces, so to remove Qaddafi, his military needed to be
attacked. Whereas Milosevic’s base of support was attacked. Undercutting Qaddafi’s
military created a situation where his hold on power was no longer tenable and he
became vulnerable. Milosevic’s government collapsed because of airpower, but Qaddafi
was killed. That facet of the outcome is not relevant when understanding the role
airpower plays because the ultimate objective was to facilitate regime change.
The attacks on Qaddafi’s military represent a denial strategy. The opening salvos
that targeted his radar and anti-aircraft installations would for the foreseeable future,
leave his regime at the mercy of any other power. Furthermore, denial targets the capacity
of a target to achieve military objectives.192 The US/NATO campaign required “planning
direct action against regime troops advancing on Libyan cities, as well as degrading the
regime’s ability to continue such attacks by damaging or destroying military facilities,
equipment, and communications capabilities.”193 A humanitarian operation cannot exist
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without crippling the capabilities of the adversary state because humanitarian forces are
soft targets like transport aircraft and helicopters. That is why I discount the humanitarian
element of the mission. The first missions of the conflict were to cripple Qaddafi’s
military regime, not support refugees. B-2s launched the opening salvo against military
assets.194 Moreover, President Obama’s stated objective of protecting civilians meant the
destruction of Qaddafi’s regime to follow through on protecting civilians.195 The Kosovo
campaign attempted this by targeting Milosevic’s military, but ethnic cleansing does not
require heavy forces. The terrain also played a role in this because Milosevic’s forces had
terrain features to use for cover, but the Libyan coastline has no such features. Also,
Qaddafi was attempting to put down an insurrection, so he had to use heavier forces to
overcome the defensive advantage the rebels had.
There was never any attempt to authorize a ground invasion. It was politically
unpopular in the United States and would have required Senate authorization. In the same
way, a ground option was never really on the table for attacking Milosevic either. From
the onset of both campaigns, it was to be conducted purely through airpower.
Kosovo and Libya diverge when considering the category of direct pressure
because as mentioned, there was never a significant push to personally attack Milosevic,
but Qaddafi represented a threat if he were permitted to persist. Qaddafi’s demise began
as his convoy was leaving Sirte, when his satellite phone call was intercepted, but was
intercepted by an RAF Tornado equipped for electronic surveillance. His convoy was
then hit with a Hellfire from a Predator and strafed by a French Rafale fighter jet. His
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loyalists scattered as rebels attacked and they ultimately captured and killed Qaddafi.
This represents a significant departure in tactics from the Kosovo campaign. This can be
partly ascribed to differences in regime type as Qaddafi’s Libya was built around his
personality and philosophy, whereas Serbia had institutions that persisted through the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This did not represent a decapitation strategy because
Qaddafi was a target of opportunity and does not represent a concerted effort to target his
person. Also, this further discredits the notion that Libya was conducted purely as a
humanitarian operation. The objective was, in Libya and Kosovo, to create a situation
where it would be untenable for Qaddafi and Milosevic to continue ruling. In both cases,
airpower did that more efficiently than a ground invasion could have been reasonable
expected to do.
The categories of weakening and political destabilization that I attribute to
Milosevic’s capitulation also apply to Qaddafi, but in different ways. Milosevic’s power
came through cronyism and the support of key families. Qaddafi was legitimized by the
monopoly on violence and his patronage system as well. But because Qaddafi was using
the full weight of his military to put down a revolt, weakening the Qaddafi regime, thus
politically destabilizing it means attacking its military. In both cases, ethnic cleansing
was the way the states wanted to maintain political control, but Qaddafi was more
outright about it, which is why his military was the vulnerable target. Also, creating areas
where the rebellion could use as a springboard for kinetic operations, like Benghazi
created a political alternative to Qaddafi. The only way to create this alternative was to
attack Qaddafi’s strength, his military.
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The first task at hand was destroying Qaddafi’s anti-aircraft capabilities because
once this happened, then combat air patrols against ground forces could be conducted
with impunity.196 Protecting Benghazi and these strike missions, although military in
nature, served to destabilize Qaddafi because he no longer had the sole claim of
legitimacy. Targets of priority included attacking Qaddafi’s aircraft to prevent them from
striking against the rebel cities and hitting any forces maneuvering on Benghazi.197 The
political parameters were in flux amongst the other NATO members, so the primary
target was the military, especially “mechanized forces, artillery, mobile surface-to-air
missile sites, interdicting their lines of communications their command and control and
any opportunities for sustainment of that activity.”198 For NATO, it was easy politically
to for a battle plan around targeting his military.
Civilian infrastructure was left off the target list because it would not affect
Qaddafi in any way. He had his own infrastructure and he controlled the state. There was
also no need to further stir dissent amongst the population at large, unlike the Milosevic
regime. In this way, targeting the military, which would be categorized as denial, really
represents political destabilization.
Mueller concludes that the US/NATO air campaign enabled the rebels to survive
Qaddafi’s initial assault and then airpower allowed the rebels to go on the offensive. It
also encouraged them to unite against Qaddafi. The mission had a mandate to protect
civilians, but the fact that US/NATO forces first target military assets revealed that the
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mission was viewed as an opportunity to take out Qaddafi and change the political order
of the region. Mueller is wrong that the mission is about humanitarianism because the
events surrounding Qaddafi’s death demonstrate otherwise. Some may try and create a
“Libyan Model” and equate it with the Afghan Model. Yes, there was synergy between
indigenous ground forces and airpower, but no American or allied personnel were
involved on the ground. Most of the targeting was done on an ad-hoc basis at the Air
Force Targeting Center or US airbases around the continental US. 199
Conclusions about the Operations
Although Operation Odyssey Dawn featured 100% use of precision guided
munitions whereas Operation Allied Force in Kosovo featured only 29%, this does not
mean that Libya was more effective, but rather those are the only munitions in Western
military stockpiles now and when the political mandate is to protect civilians, using
unguided bombs clearly runs counter to that and could have opened the operation to
criticism. Airpower in both cases was not about humanitarian principles, but about
regional order. Because both campaigns forced the leaders out of power, they ought to be
categorized as limited successes, not victories. A victory implies that the politics of the
situation changed so rapidly and that the result was formed a new political reality that
satisfies the victor in every measure. I categorize each operation as a success because
they set out to change the political realities of the situation on the ground because
anything would be preferable to their retention of power.
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The merits of intervening in Libya can be debated given the continuing civil
strife, but that precludes the possibility it also could reflect the situation in Syria. Nationstates have far greater capacity to organize and wage war than non-state actors do, which
is why the Obama Administration took the risk of going after Qaddafi.
In neither case did airpower “win” on its own. Rather it was used to alter the
political realities of the adversaries, which then opened them to challenges from political
rivals. The cases are similar because they both coerced their targets by targeting their
reasons for having power. For Milosevic, it was that he made important families wealthy
and once he endangered them, this endangered his rule. Qaddafi always had the military
and coercive state to repress any political challenger, but once that was gone he became
vulnerable. I argue that when airpower is being used against an established nation-state, it
should be targeting whatever will politically destabilize the adversarial regime.
For example, if a regime claims it holds a revolutionary group at bay, then the
military should be target. This does not fit under the category of denial because it is not
about reshaping another state’s military objectives, but rather stripping away that political
claim. If a state needs to export a product to remain economically viable, then the means
of distribution should be attacked, like airstrips and ports. This can be done without
civilian casualties and within the laws of war. Furthermore, the categories of coercion
that Lake proposes ought to be reorganized under political destabilization with all other
categories flowing from it, because as demonstrated in Kosovo and Libya, the only way
politics change is if the political underpinning of the regime is attacked. This also
achieves the important synergy of airpower because it is not bombing just to bomb, but it
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effects the strategy of the adversary. Once again, the Clausewitzian adage that war is
politics by other means rings true.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions About Airpower in American Foreign Policy
and International Relations
As a political and military strategy, particularly in the American context, airpower
has a place in the toolkit of American foreign policy. Airpower works, but it needs some
synergy with some ground force to exploit, be it a political force or a military one.
Merely dispatching cruise missiles or bombers does not create political change on its
own.
The recent cruise missile strike against Shayrat Airfield in Syria demonstrates this
well. Merely bombing Assad’s airfields will not end the conflict because there are larger
political forces in play, but if airstrikes were part of a comprehensive strategy, then
results will be more impressive. Also, the recent use of the GBU-43 Massive Ordinance
Air Blast Bomb, or MOAB in Afghanistan may have killed dozens of self-proclaimed
Islamic State fighters, but it does not address the core political issues that fester in
Afghan/ISAF politics. Moreover, it deals a limited blow to a terror network known for
resiliency.
Drones could benefit from a clear strategic outline and an espionage network that
gives operators a better picture of who to target. In conventional situations in
Afghanistan, airpower created an impossible choice when it was combined with special
forces and indigenous allies. In Kosovo and Libya, it changed Milosevic and Qaddafi’s
regimes because it undermined particular pieces of their political base of support. Each
case also had a clear political imperative to act. The objective of drone strike is to chip
away at terror networks, like al-Qaeda. The War in Afghanistan was about striking back
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at the perpetrators and abettors of 9/11. The campaigns in Kosovo and Libya were
legitimized under the auspices of humanitarian principles, but were really opportunities to
alter regional order.
To a certain extent, the theory about airpower as a political and military strategy
is trapped in the past. International relations is focused on conflict, as it should be
because war it is the most deadly and transformative force known to mankind. Too often
history and its lessons are taken as scripture and the lessons of the past are strictly applied
to the present when they may not apply at all. Theorists like Billy Mitchell and Gulio
Douchet are the modern origins that airpower can render ground forces secondary and
bring an enemy, particularly an enemy nation-state, to its knees in relatively short order.
It is attractive to American policy makers because it makes war more sanitary and
humane, but as demonstrated in the drone campaign in North Waziristan, it can be
anything but.
Alone, airpower cannot win wars or deliver positive outcomes. As Clausewitz has
written, “war is the contest of wills”. For every strategy, there is a counter-strategy and
Kosovo demonstrates this point well because not every adversary or political opponent of
the United States wants to fight on our terms. The United States is the lone superpower in
the world with the most experienced and advanced military in human history. No rational
state or non-state group would want to engage the US in a conventional struggle.
Airpower theory comes from a time when conflict was viewed only through the
perspective of nation-states in a struggle for power, but the overarching geopolitical
landscape has drastically changed. First, the US remains the predominant global power
and the nature and conduct of war has changed as a result. War and conflict have moved
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away from the affairs of states because international order is, overall, relatively stable,
but there are certain states and groups that do not have any political interest in the current
structure. At least part of the reason some have pointed to airpower as a strategy as an
ineffective because terror cells or defiant regimes lack the infrastructure or large military
apparatus to target. This is especially true for terror networks as their centers of gravity
are relationships between people. These new states and actors do not neatly fit into the
categories that exist. That is why I argue airpower alone cannot succeed, but when it has
synergy to exploit, it can work.
Furthermore, there is a widely-held belief that the next technological
advancement is always a few years away that will force the enemy to change. It is not
admitting failure or defeat by trying a new strategy. In fact, thinking outside of accepted
norms can create controlled chaos and when one side is in front of the chaos, he can
harness it to shape the outcome according to a particular vision.
Political power is inherently decided by people. During the Blitz, one of the most
fearsome aerial bombardments in human history, merely attacking civilians did not bend
the will of the British because it was a political struggle and the British people had a clear
political imperative to act. They were fighting for survival and a future, but the German
bombardment was more detached from a grand strategy. Yes, it was part of the plan for
world domination and the potential invasion of Britain, but it was bombing with the hope
of changing the mind of the average Englishman. The Blitz did not have a clear objective
to accomplish. In the 21st century, when the boundary between civilian and soldier, war
and peace, is even more blurred, airpower and military objectives need clear parameters
and objectives.
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The subject of airpower has gained an increased salience given the rise of the selfproclaimed Islamic State’s rapid advance across parts of Iraq and Syria. Airpower has
captured the attention of Americans even more recently with President Trump’s
authorization to strike Shayrat Airfield in Syria. The use of airpower, has the potential to
drastically alter the US-Russian relationship and perhaps change the nature of American
military involvement in the conflict. A miscalculation or accident has the potential to set
off the geopolitical powder keg that is the Syrian civil war. The discussion about
airpower matters, it cannot be viewed as a solution to any political problem because, as
demonstrated in Syria, a mistake can start a war.
There is no clear path that the cases I discuss lay out for guidance on dealing with
IS, but they do have valuable lessons to heed. First, airpower alone cannot win this battle.
Airpower can change political realities, like the ability of a regime to assuage supporters
and accomplish certain objectives like crushing political dissent, but there needs to be
another force to synergize with to take advantage of the battlefield conundrum of
concentrating to fight or spreading out to avoid aerial bombardment. Also, allies do not
always share the same political vision as the US. Therefore, relying only on allies to
defeat IS will not bear fruit and the region will continue to be unsettled. The introduction
of special forces and other American troops on the ground may invoke thoughts about
recycling the Afghan Model, but that would not produce a similar result. The political
situation on the ground is much less clear-cut than it was in early 2001. Also, IS and
other groups have been pushed back and are beginning to use insurgency tactics as they
lose territory. Broadly, airpower should be used to continue to whittle away at their
combat power because they cannot replace their losses in men, materiel or expertise.
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Airpower is a valuable tool in American foreign policy, as it allows the US to
make a statement around the globe in a matter of hours, but it should not be wielded
without a comprehensive strategic vision and a plan to accompany its use. The use of
airpower should not be treated lightly or as a bloodless war because it can be the opening
stages of a larger military commitment that may not be advisable. Also, technology itself
cannot be expected to solve the strategic puzzle. In conclusion, airpower has changed an
important aspect of international relations, how conflict is conducted. War is the most
destructive and transformative human activity and airpower is an important aspect of
conflict in the 21st century, so it is crucial to understand airpower.
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